

JPRS-EER-92-092
17 JULY 1992



JPRS Report

East Europe

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JPRS-EER-92-092

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Slovak Federalists View Political Developments

'Disintegration' Viewed

92CH0712A Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 24,
15-21 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Boris Lazar, translated from the Slovak: "Politics Is Something Other Than the 'Ability To Compromise'"]

[Text] It is naive to imagine that present-day Slovakia would be again open to being directed from elsewhere. That is impossible. Even because, let us say, of the genetic characteristics of Slovaks, who are capable of beginning to initiate resistance even before they know why (Ivan Carnogursky in an interview for HOSPODARSKE NOVINY on 30 January 1992).

After Munich, one British diplomat said: "We were confronted with two possibilities—to defend our honor or to save the peace. We lost our honor and we did not save the peace."

Today, we are confronted with a choice as to whether we should be saving the Czechoslovak state or democracy. It can happen to us that we will lose democracy and we will not save the state.

The Politics of Weakness and Concession

The fundamental error committed by the Pithart government was not the fact that it made concessions to Slovak demands, but the fact that it did not even attempt to formulate the Czech national interest. This is not intended to refer to one or another form of nationalism; in the Czech lands, this is not overly evident anyway. Nevertheless, there exists something like a Czech national interest and the political representation should have begun expressing it, at the latest, during the period of jurisdictional disputes.

This was not the case and a feeling arose on the Slovak side that the Czechs are not capable of identifying with themselves, but only with "Czechoslovakia." This prerequisite was then rightly and logically used by the Bratislava elite in forming its negotiating strategy.

It is not true that the Slovaks were blackmailing the Czechs. It was the Czechs themselves who provided all anti-Czech arguments. It was the Czech politicians who were scaring their own citizens and arguing that an independent Czech state would soon become "a mere appendage of Germany." And today the situation is being repeated: Voices speaking of "saving the federation" as the most important task to which everything else must be subordinated are once more heard only from the Czech political scene.

Expressed in the words of a psychologist: A part of the Czech representation is always and reliably playing the role of a conceding partner and essentially does not even offer the opponent an opportunity to behave in any other but a dominant fashion. The fact that, for two years, a weak opponent, such as Slovakia, could afford to behave

in this manner gave rise to amazement everywhere. The only ones who were not surprised were the historical lands of the Czech crown.

The remark made recently by a certain diplomat referring to some Czech politicians has thus been confirmed: "One can admire them for their intelligence, their unconventional nature, and one can feel exceedingly comfortable with them as a result of their charm and openness, but one thing one cannot do—take them seriously."

Today, the state of Czechoslovakia's disintegration is undoubtedly sufficiently dramatic for us to take it seriously. And it seems that a kind of Czech representation is coming up which can acquire a modicum of seriousness, both among its own citizens and also in the eyes of the world.

One Tribe, One Leader

Czech politicians and intellectuals have wasted an incredible quantity of energy in order to "understand the Slovaks." They were governed in this by the naive belief that this understanding will help them solve the fundamental problem: the independence of Slovakia. However, here the question was never whether the Slovaks have the right to independence, but what price the citizens of the Czech Republic would have to pay for this independence. It is symptomatic that in Bohemia the problem was never posed in this manner, at least not as far as the consequences are concerned. As early as 1990, the editors of the German weekly SPIEGEL were asking Vaclav Havel whether he considers it possible to preserve a common state with two mentally so different nations as are the Czechs and the Slovaks. The president's response was optimistic.

That which Ivan Carnogursky calls "the genetic characteristics of Slovaks" was referred to by British journalist James de Candole as tribalism, or a feeling of belonging to a tribe. According to de Candole, it is precisely this "tribal" perception of the world that is the fundamental starting point for Slovak politics. To the extent to which we accept this terminology, we can state that if the Slovak tribe casts its votes for Vladimir Meciar they were not electing either the right or the left, or communism or democracy, but a leader whom they expect to promote their interests very decisively.

I shall permit myself the heretical idea that politics is something more than the art of compromise or an effort to achieve an orderly state; that it expresses the mentality of nations and the emotions of individuals far more than is generally ascribed to politics. For this reason, the foreseeable future will not see the existence of a common European policy in a form other than bureaucratic regulations, on which representatives of the individual governments involved agree. Europeanness, as an authentic feeling by an individual equivalent to national identity, virtually does not exist.

Today's Slovak politics is made up of a mixture of Byzantine messianism, the myth of an innocent and

long-suffering nation, as well as some generally intelligent pragmatism. This mixture is occasionally confusing: A Slovak entrepreneur, who wants an independent Slovak state, attends church, elects communists, and deposits his money in a Czech bank—to an outsider, this looks like a paradox; the Slovak individual, however, does not consider his existence to be paradoxical and has, thus far, always been able to take care of himself.

Vladimir Meciar is undoubtedly the natural representative of today's Slovaks. It is not true that he came to power thanks to the "working class," as some federalist intellectuals in Bratislava contend. He was elected by people of the most varied professions and received many votes from young people, which is probably most important. If someone criticizes the Slovak leader for lacking in character—for his opinion leaps from "an authentic federation" via a confederation all the way to an "economic defense association"—they should realize that Meciar, much like the majority of Slovaks, arrived at his views gradually. And by the way, sticking to precise concepts was never very important to Slovak society, which "thinks with its heart."

Similarly unsubstantiated are the criticisms of the Pithart government that its soft approach actually facilitated the disintegration of the state. The Pithart team only slowed down the first half of this disintegration and, with its rhetoric, helped in fogging up the entire problem. However, the Jan Kalvoda case brings up the question as to whether the Czech public was even willing at that time to accept anything short of a counterposition.

An Amicable Parting of the Ways Is Not Possible

To the extent to which anyone today wishes to ardently speak out for preservation of the joint state, he should explain what kind of state he has in mind.

The minimum attributes of the modern democratic state are: a sovereign parliament, responsibility on the part of every minister for his department to the delegates, and respect for international law. It is clear that in today's meetings between the victors of the elections, no such state is involved. It is impossible to reject Slovak ambition for full international recognition, but in that case we are no longer dealing with a common state, but rather with its disintegration. The most absurd objection that has been heard in this connection thus far is the fact that the victorious parties did not obtain the mandate of their voters to negotiate the disintegration of the CSFR.

With a large preponderance of their votes, the citizens in Slovakia elected those parties which have clearly spoken against the present federation, even though it is a relatively free one already. In the Czech lands, the rightist parties won; their programs do not contain the "preservation of the state" as the number one priority. Without regard as to whether the Czech representatives will capitulate in the face of Meciar's demands or not, the partitioning of the state is involved. No other topic is possible.

The horizon of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia should not be either excessively far down the line nor should it be overly close. This is important because when it does occur it will be a tragedy, one way or another, for tens of thousands and possibly hundreds of thousands of people. A more or less civilized parting of the ways is possible, but an amicable parting of the ways, such as that of which some overeager Slovak representatives speak, is not possible.

Meciar's remark that only nations, but not nationalities, have the right to self-determination sounds ominous. It is literally a replication of the Milosevic statement in which the Serbian leader responded to a question as to whether, in addition to the Serbs, those from Bosnia and Hercegovina also have the right to their own development?

Communists Return

92CH0712B Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 24,
15-21 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Milan Zitny: "Operating on a Pair of Siamese Twins—The Return of Communists to Power in Slovakia"]

[Text] The events of recent days in Czechoslovakia, following the elections, have taken on such a pace that some people are beginning to be short of breath and others short on patience. Those who have apparently recovered in both republics are the Communists and their former associates, who are distributed throughout a broad leftist front. The victory of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] in Slovakia has resulted in the heirs to the ideas of collectivism once more aspiring to lost power. The reward for the citizens of Slovakia is to be a hitherto unrecognized feeling of pride and self-awareness. However, the second attempt to establish a national state of Slovaks toward the end of the 20th century is beginning with a return to lies and restricted freedom for citizens who have, by voting, voluntarily degraded themselves to being mere members of the population.

The Operation Will Be Performed Without Anesthetic

Vladimir Meciar realizes that in negotiating the future of Czechoslovakia, he must at the very least maintain the decorum of constitutionality, even though he no longer wants to adhere to the Constitution. However, because he knows that his approach (beginning with the sovereignty declaration, through the Constitution of the state itself with a formal referendum at the end) is unconstitutional, he confronted Vaclav Klaus with unfulfillable conditions with which he is forcing Klaus to take the first steps toward a parting of the ways. He is demanding that Klaus give up Vaclav Havel as a candidate for the presidency of the common state, as well as giving up the progress made hitherto in the economic reform. It is no accident that these are two fundamental symbols of Czechoslovakia which made it famous and which helped it gain general recognition in democratic nations. If these symbols fall, the return to conditions prior to 17

November 1989 will be the winner. By cutting itself off from Slovakia as a dying Siamese twin, however, the Czech part of the federation can save itself and, after recovering, I judge that it can even prosper and exist democratically. The fact that this difficult and complicated operation will not be accomplished without tears and pain is not doubted by anyone anymore. The operation will take place without an anesthetic. The Slovak part of the patient is silent for the time being. It will come out of its existing lethargy after the first cut is made.

A Falsehood as a Foundation of Future Law

The only legal method of dividing a common state is the referendum. In order for a loose union of two independent sovereign states to come into being between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as is suggested by the HZDS, both republics must first become independent. However, the HZDS claims—and its voters also understand this—that it does not want to break up the common state because its election program nowhere mentions an independent state. Nevertheless, it has in its program, a sequence of steps ranging from the declaration of sovereignty to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic as an independent state to be followed only after this by a referendum. Faith in Meciar is stronger than the sense for reality and voters essentially do not care that the adoption of a constitution for the Slovak Republic, with full jurisdictions appropriate to an independent state, is in conflict with the valid Constitution of the federation and thus, the referendum following an unconstitutional step need not even come about. In Slovakia, there is evidently no relevant political will to preserve Czechoslovakia. The citizens have sacrificed the federation for a vision of better times under the leadership of the HZDS and do not care at all that this movement is not a democratic one and that it is again deceiving them. They have believed that the steps taken by the HZDS are legitimately and legally taken and will

benefit Slovakia. It is alleged that this is not the question of restoring modified socialist power, but of fulfilling the natural longings of every nation. What patriot would not swallow that bait?...

A Phobia Based on Freedom of the Word

In order for nothing to cloud over the image of a more beautiful tomorrow in an independent Slovakia, Meciar is already now making sincere efforts to influence the flow of information. The proposal to do away with federal radio and television, the refusal to answer the editor of *MLADA FRONTA DNES* as an "untrustworthy journalist," the barring of a group of Slovak, Czech, but also foreign journalists from a press conference, avoiding immediate uncontrolled contact with the media—all of this clearly signals his growing phobia of the freedom of expression on the one hand, his phobia involving journalists who ask unpleasant questions, but, at the same time, these are also signals for those others to stay away from similar tactics. This belief was confirmed by Meciar himself when, at a press conference for "selected" journalists, he said that citizens, but journalists also, will have to make a decision as to which side they are on. He could not have given a more precise and more specific last warning.

Return to Power

A lie that is repeated 100 times can become the truth. However, for the time being, it is not known how many times it is necessary to repeat a truth in order for it to be perceived as the truth in Slovakia. When it happens—an independent Slovakia beset by external and internal problems—then the idea for its own national state will be overwhelmed and buried for the next 20 years. However, this idea is of no concern to the representatives of the HZDS and not even to those of the SNS [Slovak National Party] or for that matter of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left]. For them, it is only a means of reacquiring power.

Phase II of Self-Privatization Reported

92CH0654B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
4 Jun 92 p 19

[Article by Ervin Zsubori: "Decentralized Privatization, Phase II; The Freedom of the Chosen"]

[Text] First, it was called self-privatization. Later, it was christened a simplified privatization on the company's initiative, and most recently, it is being talked about as decentralized privatization. The reality behind all three names is the same: the mass privatization of companies with the involvement of outside experts, essentially bypassing the AVU [State Property Agency].

The idea apparently has passed the test. The self-privatization program was started in October 1991. Originally, 348 small companies were given the opportunity to privatize themselves with the help of one of the 84 designated expert firms. After an opening phase of distrust, it seems that more companies have acquired a taste for individual initiatives: The circle is continually being enlarged by applications for admission, and by now the number of companies has reached 437. That the model works is proven by the fact that by the end of May 360 companies had succeeded in reaching an agreement with one of the experts, and 96 companies have already been transformed into corporations. This is the phase where trouble begins. So far, only 13 companies have succeeded in actually selling all, or more than half, of their property (most of it became the property of each company's employees). The engagement by the experts is satisfactory as well: About 90 percent of the experts in question have already come to an agreement with at least one company.

The experiences of phase one have been mostly favorable. The companies are generally satisfied with this simplified form of privatization, and after the initial difficulties, both the training of the experts and the degree of preparation of the contracts have improved according to an evaluation by the AVU. At any rate, the positive features were emphatic enough for the AVU to decide in March to start phase two of the program, after drawing the necessary conclusions. On the basis of this decision, a group was designated of medium-sized state-owned companies, so far 278 in number, which will be given the right to participate in round two. The upper limit on the value of each company's property is around 1 billion forints (for the list of companies with property exceeding 500 million forints, see the table), and on this level the turnover data are no longer negligible (in the case of 13 companies, the yearly turnover exceeds 1 billion forints). The entire property in question amounts to about 70 billion forints, in contrast with the approximately 22 billion forints involved in phase one.

In relation to the branches of industry, the picture is fairly mixed. Numerous printers and many prestigious publishing houses (e.g., Corvina, Europa, Gondolat, Magveto, Mora, Muszaki, and Szepirodalmi) were put on the list, along with companies in heavy and light industry, construction and shipping firms, and machine

works. Apart from a few exceptions, however, companies in the areas of trade, research and development, and agriculture are missing from this list. The AVU intends to privatize these latter companies in a different way.

In phase two it is to be expected that the circle of experts will be augmented by about 50 firms. The AVU invited open bids, which can be submitted before 7 May by firms registered in Hungary that have experience in privatization, have at least 10 million forints' worth of unencumbered assets of their own, or a declaration of cash guarantee in the same amount, and which employ experts with the appropriate training. The evaluation of the bids is underway. The second phase of the program is expected to start in the middle of June, after both the selected new experts and those previous ones which have performed to the AVU's satisfaction will have signed the modified contractual agreement with the property agency.

The new contractual agreement, valid until 31 December 1993, differs in numerous points from its structurally similar forerunner. A regulation, intended to increase the experts' involvement, prescribes that the experts who have participated in phase one must come to an agreement with at least one company within 90 days of the signing of the contractual agreement, whereas the new experts must do so within 180 days. (At the same time, the regulations try to curb excessive greed by allowing the firms to contract with no more than 15 companies.) Another rule, intended to decrease the possibility of bias, prescribes that the assessment of property be done by an assessor independent of both the company and the experts, and that it must be certified by an accountant who is likewise independent. Another new feature is that the AVU will set a price limit binding for the experts concerning the sale of membership rights, the basis of which will be 80 percent of the capital of the state-owned company. For sales below this price, a written permit by the AVU is necessary.

Although in phase two the expert is still interested in the sale of the company at the earliest possible time and for the highest possible price, the fees of the experts will be modified because of the change in the size of the companies to be privatized. The basic commission fee will be 5 percent on the first 300 million forints, 4 percent on the portion between 300 and 600 million, and 3 percent for the portion above 600 million. On top of this, in case of a sale this year, a bonus for speed is payable to the expert, and in case of a sale above the price limit, the expert is entitled to a bonus for success. All fees are payable on the basis of the purchase price (or dividend) actually transferred to the AVU.

In phase two, the AVU will tighten its control over the procedures. One of the areas where the agency will exercise the strictest control is in the bank guarantee amounting to 10 percent of the company's property which the AVU can confiscate within 180 days of the sale if it finds irregularities.

The AVU expects decentralized privatization to continue to be a success. Moreover, a statement by

privatization minister Tamas Szabo suggests that phase three will start sooner or later. And that will indeed be the hunting ground of the big fish.

[Box, p 19]

Experts in Waiting

In phase one of self-privatization, by the end of May the following companies among the 84 designated experts had not done business with any of the state-owned companies in the program: Agrargazdasagi Kutato

Intezet [Agrarian Research Institute], Budapest Bank Rt. [Ltd.], Coopers and Lybrand Konyvvizsgalo Kft. [Coopers and Lybrand Accountants, Inc.], Coopholding Elso Szovetkezeti Vagyonkezelő Rt. [Coopholding First Cooperative Trustees, Ltd.], Creditanstalt Ertekpapir Rt. [Creditanstalt Securities, Ltd.], Hungaroswiss Budapest Rt., Landerbank Broker Budapest Kft., Magyar Paribas Rt., Management Vezetesi-Szervezesi Tanacsado Kft. [Management and Organizational Consultants, Inc.], Nomura Magyar Befektetesi Bank Rt. [Nomura Hungarian Investment Bank, Ltd.], Price Waterhouse Budapest Kft.

Companies With Property Exceeding 500,000 Forints in Phase II of Self-Privatization

Name of the Company	Company Property (in thousands of forints)
1. Reanal Finomvegyszergyár [Reanal Fine Chemical Works]	949,000
2. Szamitastechnikai Alkalmazasi V. [Applied Computational Technology Company] (SZAMALK)	926,587
3. Budapesti Epitoipari Szallito V. [Budapest Construction Materials Forwarding Company]	904,195
4. AGROKER [Agricultural Trading Company] (Kecskemet)	800,474
5. Komarom Megyei Allami Epito V. [State Construction Company of Komarom County]	750,408
6. Csepel Muvek Vas-es Acelontode [Csepel Works Iron and Steel Foundry]	729,638
7. Femmunkas V. [Metal Works]	721,000
8. Iparcikk Kolcsonzo es Szolgáltato V. [Consumer Goods Leasing Company]	720,598
9. Gyori EPFU [Construction Forwarding Company of Győr]	717,602
10. Vizugyi Epito V. (VIZEP) [Waterworks Construction Company]	685,137
11. REMIX Radiotechnikai V. [Radio Technology Company]	684,704
12. BETEX Textilkereskedelmi V. [Textile Trading Company]	682,006
13. Híradastechnikai Anyagok Gyára [Factory of Telecommunications Materials]	659,000
14. RECOMIX Elektronikai V. [Electronic Works]	658,277
15. Budacolor Festekgyár [Budacolor Paint Factory]	656,360
16. Tavkozlesi Kutato Intezet (TAKI) [Telecommunications Research Institute]	652,677
17. Alföldi Koolajipari Gépgyár [Oil-Processing Machine Factory of the Great Hungarian Plains]	651,091
18. Lampart Vegyipari Gépgyár [Lampart Chemical Processing Machine Factory]	650,809
19. Epitoanyag Fuvarozo es Szolgáltato V. [Building Materials Forwarding and Supplying Company]	649,024
20. Bajai Hutoipari Vallalat [Baja Refrigeration Company]	648,054
21. FERROBETON Dunaujvarosi Vasbetonelemgy. V. [Reinforced Concrete Structure Factory of Dunaujvaros]	647,932
22. Allatforgalmi es Husipari Szolgáltato V. [Animal Trading and Meat-Processing Supplying Company]	613,247
23. GRACIA Kereskedelmi V. [Trading Company]	612,229
24. Paksi Konzervgyar [Paks Canning Factory]	596,056
25. Pecs Fuvarozo es Szolgáltato V. [Pecs Forwarding and Supplying Company]	586,095
26. Villamoszigetelo es Muanyaggyar [Electric Insulation and Plastics Factory]	575,000
27. Ganz Kiskunhalasi Gépgyar V. [Kiskunhalas Machine Works]	565,950
28. BAJATEX Bajai Textilipari V. [Baja Textile Works]	562,259
29. Tolna Megyei Allami Epitoipari V. [State Construction Company of Tolna County]	545,409
30. Nyomdai Grafikai V. [Graphics Printing Company]	541,398
31. Transelektro Magyar Kulkereskedelmi V. [Transelektro Hungarian Foreign Trading Company]	532,507
32. Ercsi Cukorgyar [Ercsi Sugar Works]	523,177
33. Kozponti Banyaszati Fejlesztési Intezet [Central Mining Development Institute]	507,440

Agriculture Minister Balla on Crop Forecast

92CH0651A Budapest VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 9 May 92 p unknown

[Interview with Dr. Istvan Balla, deputy department head of the Ministry of Agriculture, by I.V.; place and date not given: "Before Restructuring; 500,000 Hectares Fallow"]

[Text] *In Hungary, the area on which fall crops were sown was 400,000 hectares fewer than in the previous year. According to the latest survey, this does not yet indicate the final situation because growers have not compensated for this with spring crops. The sowing of corn, green vegetables, and silo corn is not yet completed but, according to estimates, about 500,000 hectares are expected to remain fallow this year, as opposed to last year's 100,000 hectares. Based on the reports of large enterprises and the county agricultural offices, Dr. Istvan Balla, deputy department head of the Ministry of Agriculture [FM], provided a summary of the crop-growing situation.*

Of the fall crops, it was wheat whose sowing area decreased the most: Only 840,000 hectares were sown as opposed to last year's 1,152,000 hectares. In view of last year's marketing problems, the FM originally recommended that wheat growers use 900,000 hectares, a 20-percent decrease. The enterprises' sowing plans still called for 936,000 hectares but, in the end, due to excessive precipitation that slowed down work in the fall, and the following winter decay, only 827,000 hectares were sown. This was 76,000 hectares less than recommended by the ministry, but the difference is not too significant, said Dr. Istvan Balla.

The FM expected that more rye and barley would be sown on the former wheat areas, but this expectation materialized only in part. In comparison to last year, the area of fall barley was modestly increased from 208,000 to 225,000 hectares; on the other hand, that of spring barley had a much greater increase, from 146,000 to 228,000 hectares. The latter resulted in part from the increased demand of breweries and in part from compensating for former wheat-growing areas. However, rye was sown only on 72,000 hectares, which is 20,000 less than last year, for the food industry did not need any more, and the growing of rye on less fertile areas is unprofitable under the present conditions.

Of the spring crops, it was sugar beets that was decreased to the greatest extent for, as opposed to last year's 161,000 hectares, which was unjustifiably high, only 106,000 hectares were sown whit beets. The growing of oil seeds fell from last year's 510,000 hectares to 475,000 hectares. The sown area of sunflowers, the largest item within these, changed little, from 391,000 to 389,000 hectares. At the same time, that of rape increased from 52,000 to 60,000 hectares, and that of soybeans decreased from 25,000 to 24,000 hectares.

No significant changes are expected in the growing of protein crops; the growing of peas, which is the determining item, will be unchanged: Seed peas were sown on 105,000 hectares, in addition to 30,000 hectares of green peas.

On the other hand, there was an obvious decrease in the sown area of green vegetables. Because of their weakened positions and shrinking markets, the canning factories put in much smaller orders for basic produce. For this reason, harvesting of vegetables is expected on only 83,000 hectares as opposed to last year's 112,000 hectares.

The sowing of corn, which, next to wheat, is another crop that determines the sowing structure, is only 80-percent completed, but the plan calls for a sown area of 1,155,000 hectares as opposed to last year's 1,126,000 hectares. Despite the announced bidding (VILAGGAZDASAG, 8 May 1992, page 7), no greater increase can be expected. Because of a decrease in the livestock, silo corn, our number one fodder crop, will probably be sown only on 200,000 hectares as opposed to last year's 250,000 hectares.

The sowing of only a few crops has not yet been completed: 85 percent of the vegetables, 75 percent of the silo corn, and 80 percent of the corn is in the ground. The situation of corn is worse than average, for 10-20 percent of it is usually sown in May, whereas this year 50-60 percent remained for May. Despite this, we can still have a good corn crop if precipitation in July and August will be favorable.

It is too early yet to evaluate the crop yield as a whole. This much is certain: If the weather remains dry (at present, humidity in the top 20 centimeters of the soil is only 30-40 percent, while the temperature is unusually high), then we must expect a worse-than-average yield. However, adequate precipitation may offset the yield-decreasing effect of lower-quality seeds and farming technology.

No great changes are expected in the crop structure—other than the significant decrease in the sown area of wheat and vegetables. The main reason for this is that the tendency of decreasing the area of wheat while increasing the area of industrial plants, which can be grown more economically, already began in earlier years. Everything depends on what kinds of crops the processors and buyers will order. It seems that growers have been more careful lately to begin growing only after receiving the purchase orders.

Hardly any new, potentially alternate, crops have emerged in the crop structure; in the absence of demand, growers prefer leaving their less fertile lands fallow. However, Balla said that this fallow area of half a million hectares does not threaten domestic supply, for in earlier years one-third of the crop harvested on Hungary's 4.5 million hectares of arable land was exported, i.e., the decrease in both yield and sown area, even when combined, will not threaten domestic supply.

Prime Minister Describes Views, Background

AU1507130292 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
11-12 Jul 92 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka by Jacek Zakowski on 9 July; place not given: "A Serious Woman"]

[Text] [Zakowski] This is already your third term in the Sejm, but for the great majority of Poles your candidacy for prime minister came as a complete surprise. Hardly anyone knew about the key role that you had played in the last Sejm as the Solidarity deputy chairman of the legislative commission. Few people also knew that you have been deputy chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly since May. Where does Hanna Suchocka come from? You were born in Pleszew near Poznan. Both your parents were chemists. What was your home and your family like? What kind of tradition did you grow up in—National Democrat, Christian Democrat, or Pilsudski-ite?

[Suchocka] It was a Wielkopolska Christian Democrat home, but there was no cult of any particular politician. There was, however, a cult of patriotic and Catholic values. It was not, perhaps, a typically Poznan home, because my mother came from Kielce. In our family there was perhaps a certain amount of conflict between the different sets of values that predominated in Wielkopolska and in the Congress Kingdom of Poland.

[Zakowski] What would you say those basic values were?

[Suchocka] Truth, above all. It was very deeply impressed on me that it was wrong to lie. If someone—and this sometimes happens in light of the brutal character of Polish politics—accuses me of lying, I consider that to be a charge of the most serious kind, because I was raised in an atmosphere of complete honesty. I never had to say that I went to school when I had played truant. I was brought up in a spirit of inner discipline, integrity, and honesty, as well as one of Polishness and Polish culture. My mother knew Mickiewicz and Kochanowski by heart. She would impart her knowledge to us to an extent that almost bored us.

[Zakowski] What about your involvement in public affairs? Does that also stem from family traditions?

[Suchocka] My grandmother was very active in the Catholic Action movement and was awarded the "Pro ecclesia and pontifice" papal order. My aunt, who received the same order, was president of the National Association of Young Catholic Women. The whole family was involved in Catholic social activities. There is quite a long tradition of participation in public affairs in our family. My grandfather was born in 1855 and bought the pharmacy in Pleszew in 1895. The building is almost 100 years old and there is still a pharmacy there. Our home is also there. People in our family used to say that we come from a home where there was a piano.

[Zakowski] And from a home where there were very emancipated women.

[Suchocka] Yes, they were emancipated, involved in public affairs, and very close. I was very good friends with my aunt, although she was born in 1896 and there was an age difference of 50 years between us. She died when she was 86, and remained very youthful until then. She never married, but, at the same time, did not become eccentric. Until the end of her life she believed that one must lead a full life, free of prejudice. It was a normal family, a normal home, in which there was discipline, but not such that it was forced on us. My upbringing was about being raised in a world of values that must also be observed when no one controls us.

[Zakowski] What about your brothers and sisters?

[Suchocka] I have one sister, who looks after my home, the family home, and looks after all my affairs...

[Zakowski] ...And there is a dog.

[Suchocka] The dog belongs to both of us, but I do not know what I would do without my sister. That is what happens to a woman who is involved in politics. My sister, who is married, gives up time she needs to look after her own home to see to my affairs.

[Zakowski] Is that why there is no other woman in your government?

[Suchocka] Unfortunately, that was not up to me. The coalition parties did not propose any women. Had I been able to, I would have proposed a few women. One can really work well together with women. They are dependable and conscientious.

[Zakowski] Are you not afraid that there will be problems in a government entirely made up of men, and also so politically eclectic?

[Suchocka] I am not afraid of cooperation with men, because I have always worked with them. I expect the government to be faced with other problems. I was aware of that from the very outset. In my immediate circle I will have two friends, Tadeusz Syryjczyk and Jan Rokita, on whom I will be counting heavily. I hope that we will overcome any setbacks together.

[Zakowski] Let's return to the past. You finished studying law in 1968 and a year later you joined the Democratic Party [SD]. Why did you do that?

[Suchocka] As soon as I had completed my studies I obtained a college teaching post, despite strong opposition. It was only a junior post, not a tenured one. I was told that the department was an ideological one and that permanent posts are only for members of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party].

[Zakowski] What department was that?

[Suchocka] State law, what is now called constitutional law. I was interested in other national systems. I tried to teach and make the acquaintance of students from foreign legal institutions operating under various systems. Because I did not join the party, I was not given a

permanent post after my one year in a junior post. I was also unofficially told that the college was not a place for SD members....

[Zakowski] How did you find yourself in the Sejm in 1980?

[Suchocka] At that time, one got into the Sejm according to a formula. They were looking for a woman lawyer who belonged to the SD. I had earlier, following a certain political thaw, returned to the college and was teaching constitutional law. I considered it to be an excellent opportunity for me, a theoretician, to come into contact with constitutional practice. The experience was a very strong test of my views and enabled me to take a less dogmatic view of the Constitution. Besides, as soon as I entered the Sejm, a very exceptional period began. It was the August that saw the emergence of Solidarity. I was a member of Solidarity from the beginning, and I felt that I could only work in the Sejm as a deputy who represented the Solidarity program.

[Zakowski] Your speeches at that time, first against the law on taxation of undisclosed income and then on censorship, which you called "the restriction of a basic human right," were notable even then, against the background of a Sejm that was in a profound state of revolt following August.

[Suchocka] That now seems quite trivial, but please bear in mind that it was 12 years ago. We, in that Sejm, were creating the first breakthroughs.

[Zakowski] How were those speeches received by your colleagues in the SD, which was a clearly reformist party compared to the United Peasant Party and the PZPR?

[Suchocka] It did not arouse much emotion at that time, because the SD really was a party that was searching, and it even seemed to me that it would be possible to change the party for the better. All that came to an end after martial law. It became obvious to me and several of my colleagues that we have to break with the party. People such as Dorota Simonides, the late Maria Budzanowska, and I realized that a gulf had emerged between society's expectations and what the UD represented.

[Zakowski] In 1982 you voted against declaring Solidarity illegal.

[Suchocka] Yes, and that really did cause an uproar, because it was the final accord legalizing the martial law order. Enormous pressure was exerted on us, but I could only vote against it. I had many meetings with students. One student told me that if I had behaved differently in the Sejm, it would have contradicted what I had taught them. I was not ashamed of what I did.

[Zakowski] For voting against declaring Solidarity illegal your rights as a SD member were suspended, but you only left the party in 1984. Why did you leave so late?

[Suchocka] The party disciplinary proceedings that were instituted against us lasted over a year. We were accused of harming the interests of the state. I believed that leaving the party before a decision was announced would

have meant that I accepted the charges, and I felt that by voting against declaring the union illegal we were defending the public interest and thus the national interest. I decided to finally leave when the people's council electoral code came before the Sejm. I returned my party membership card in order to be free to vote against it.

[Zakowski] You did not stand as a candidate in the 1985 elections.

[Suchocka] There was no question of that. I was told "your political career is over and perhaps your professional career too." It was obvious to me that I was on the side of those of those who were opposed to martial law and the order that it established. When I was in the Sejm, I expressed my position the way a deputy could. Later, there was no place for me in that system.

[Zakowski] How did you find yourself on "Walesa's team" in 1989?

[Suchocka] I was encouraged to join by my friends in Poznan, who knew me well and knew that I had been faithful to Solidarity the entire time and that I had not betrayed its ideals. They sought to convince me that it would be a very good thing if the first group of Solidarity deputies to enter parliament were to include someone who already had Sejm experience.... They finally convinced me one morning, at 0200.

[Zakowski] Speaking about human rights in 1990, you made a statement that might prove very uncomfortable for Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka. That was that the assumption underpinning the concept of human rights is that the individual must always come before the group. As prime minister, you will no doubt have to enforce the laws of the state, that is, of a great and organized group, with respect to the individual, if only in relation to the protesting farmers.

[Suchocka] That does not mean that the rights of the individual have to be violated. The rights of the individual cannot be solely a product of collective laws as is envisaged by socialism. We refer to another concept, which goes back to the very basics, to natural law, and natural law has an individualistic character. The laws of the group are derived from the rights of the individual.

[Zakowski] You have also said something that sounds promising to some and disturbing to others, namely, that in general you accept the principles of Margaret Thatcher's economic policies. What is your attitude toward the type of woman in politics that Margaret Thatcher represented, with her vision of exceptionally strong political authority and equally strong liberalism in the economy?

[Suchocka] Well, there is no doubt that Poland needs strong political authority. On other hand, the situation in the economy is much more complex. The question cannot be answered that simply, but essentially, I believe what I said.

[Zakowski] What happened that made the ZChN [Christian-National Union] leaders consider you to be the only UD deputy who would be acceptable as prime minister?

[Suchocka] I think that your information is wrong. I have witnessed what I can even call very close friendships between UD and ZChN deputies. I am one of many in the UD whose ties with the Church have always been obvious, perhaps because I taught at the Catholic University in Lublin for many years. If they are well acquainted with my past, then they know that within the realm of values, I hold that there are certain boundaries that cannot be crossed under any circumstances. Those boundaries are dictated by basic Christian values.

[Zakowski] Nevertheless, when Solidarity and the Citizens Parliamentary Club split, you joined the UD and not the ZChN or the Center Accord, which strongly emphasize Catholicism.

[Suchocka] That is because the UD as a pluralist organization allows me to preserve what I wanted to save, Christian values free from political interference.

[Zakowski] In your opinion, where does the boundary lie between matters of faith or conscience, and the state? You were in favor of inserting a clause on "Christian values" into the education law. Is that an indication of your position as prime minister on relations between Church and state?

[Suchocka] For me, Christian values constitute the core of universal values. There is no question in that respect of denominational egoism or of religious indoctrination. I have no such intentions.

[Zakowski] How did you become a candidate for the office of chairman of the Council of Minister?

[Suchocka] It came as a complete surprise to me and essentially it was deeply embarrassing. I was far from keen on the idea.

[Zakowski] What argument prevailed?

[Suchocka] First, some time passed. I then asked myself what would happen if I did not agree. I was told that there is a risk that the whole coalition would fall apart. It is a known fact that there are certain stages to negotiations in politics. When a certain stage is reached and when one of the sides on which the negotiations were based lets you down, the entire talks may fail and all the other decisions may lose their validity. When I returned from London, I could have accepted the proposal or assumed responsibility for the risk of prolonging the crisis. I had virtually no choice. I did not want to be considered a woman who lacks seriousness.

[Zakowski] To what extent is it important to you as prime minister that you are a woman?

[Suchocka] It has the virtue of being something different, and that has not been the case with Polish politics so far. Maybe it is something positive, something that will provide a chance.... Some people told me that Polish men are chivalrous and that they will not attack a

woman, but one can already see that that does not apply in politics. That argument does not count.

[Zakowski] For several months now, you have been deputy chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. How important will that experience be to you as prime minister?

[Suchocka] I am somewhat sorry to be giving up those duties. I was only just beginning to make full use of my Sejm experience and joining various structures and commissions. Previously, I was quite well-established in various international bodies. I will lose all of that now. I will lose the academic and to some extent the political contacts that I formed over the years. There will be no time for that. In the plane from London I heard someone say "that Suchocka should hurry up, because if she doesn't then they won't let her have the post." I thought to myself: "Well, it might not be too bad a thing if they succeed."

[Zakowski] But they didn't!

[Suchocka] So it seems

Coal Export Monopoly Argument Countered

90EP05.0A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 25 May 92 p 1

[Article by Alfred Biec, economist, secretary to the Socioeconomic Committee of the Council of Ministers: "The 'Weglokoks' Monopoly and the State Interest"]

[Text] At the end of May 1992, reserves of coal piled up at mines amounted to about 5 million [metric] tons, more than at any time in postwar history, and they are also growing at a record rate of more than 100,000 tons a day, about 20 percent of daily production of the Polish mines. The power plants, the largest consumers of coal (about 34 percent of the annual mine production), ended the winter with large reserves. Thus, one cannot count on them absorbing the growing coal flood. Only increased exports can help the mines. Meanwhile, under the guise of limiting Polish-Polish competition, an embarrassing article by Jan Dziadul in POLITYKA (23 April 1992) defends the monopoly position of the Weglokoks Central Foreign Trade Agency in Polish coal exports. The argument reduces to the thesis that maintaining the monopoly of Weglokoks in coal exports serves the state interest. And perhaps one ought to get clear about this if this thesis did not hobble thinking about competition in the economy in general and, in particular, in coal mining and, as a result, in the entire economy.

I do not intend to continue a debate with the text from POLITYKA any further. Rather, I want to reply to a certain type of argument for maintaining monopolies, though within the context of the example of the coal market.

In order to justify this position, it is necessary to ask: "Whose interests does the Weglokoks Foreign Trade Agency represent?" Its own and that of several mines that export coal through that organization. I am thinking

here of those mines for which participation in exports through Weglokoks is a significant percentage of total production.

Thus, these interests are not those of all of coal mining, and certainly not the interests of those mines which are suffocating from an oversupply of coal, which threatens them with a halt in production or with liquidation—and the state with an increase in unemployment—with additional budget burdens for unemployment benefits, and with the costs of liquidating the mines. Moreover, these costs are not small—consider the example of Walbrzych. Thus, suffocation is not in the state interest.

Prior to May 1992, about 7 million tons of coal had been exported, chiefly through Weglokoks, which receives the majority of export permits for coal. That is not much. If we export coal at that rate, at the end of the year we will have a surplus of at least 4-7 million tons of coal. There are also estimates indicating the surplus may even exceed 10 million tons. Who will pay the mines for that coal? Weglokoks? No, because it has already earned its share. It did not ruin the market for foreign competitors, and what does it care if others had to limit production or were left with unsold coal, or if it becomes necessary to close other mines and leave another group of people without work.

The argument that only one-quarter of the coal mined is exported is false. If that were the case, it would mean that Polish coal is extremely bad (which is not the case); it would also mean that around the world worse coal is not mined and used than coal deemed exportable. That is also not true. Thus, we can export greater quantities of coal. Obviously for suitably lower prices.

It is worth noting that one-quarter of the Polish coal mined equals about 35 million tons. Meanwhile, exports at the rate given above would lead to exports of about 20 million tons. That means there would be another 15 million tons to the limit of exportable quantities. Who will export that coal?

It is also not true that the world coal market is divided among traditional suppliers and consumers, although

many would like that, and that it is difficult to horn more Polish coal into it. The condemned Polish-Polish competition contradicts the assumption. It turns out that it is very easy for a Polish competitor to displace Weglokoks from a foreign market. On the other hand, the Czechs have nearly displaced Weglokoks from the Austrian market. Where are the divisions and traditional connections here?

This gives rise to another question: Why is Weglokoks, which employs many outstanding specialists, incapable of driving foreign competitors from foreign markets? Why has it shown no initiative in this area and concentrated instead on limiting exports of Polish coal and knocking off Polish competitors? Is not taking over foreign markets from foreign competitors protection of Polish interests? Has Weglokoks thrown anybody, other than Polish coal exporters, out of any markets?

There is one conclusion from all of the above: The decisions to demonopolize coal exports were correct, and they should be retained. They will make it possible for many mines to survive because they will be able "to export greater quantities of coal outside of the structure of Weglokoks." And nothing will happen if coal is sold below the price offered by Weglokoks. The price at which the mines want to sell their coal to a foreign customer is exclusively the business of the mines. In some cases, they may even do so below cost, and it will be necessary to consider that normal, although unpleasant for the competition.

I think that it is reasonable to regulate coal exports (price, destination, quantity), but it must be done in agreement with the exporters. It must be in accord with the expectations of the mines which in their own interest recognize the need to coordinate and desire to subordinate themselves to joint decisions. As long as some want to solve these problems by forcing a return to the coal export monopoly on the government, it will be a signal that the above-mentioned agreement among mines has not been reached, and that the administrative monopoly is to serve some against the others.

Tudjman on Confederation of Croatia, Bosnia

92BA1155A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 92 p 4

[Interview with Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, by Josip Jovic in Zagreb; date not given]

[Text] [Jovic] In Croatia's struggle for independence and for peace, we have an enhanced role of the president, of you personally. Tomorrow, the struggle will be to build the economy, democracy, market relations. Does that not call for a different and smaller role of the president?

[Tudjman] Not essentially smaller than today. Look at the world. The talk about the exaggerated role of the president is the most ordinary nonsense. Usually the president's position reflects the character of the person who heads the state. In general, we find that where major issues have to be resolved the presidential system is more effective. Cossiga departed saying that they should look into the demand that the president have more than formal powers. Take the French example, the American, the Russian, the Ukrainian. Everywhere the trend is toward the presidential system. It depends on circumstances and individuals. Even where you have a purely parliamentary system, as in Britain, Margaret Thatcher held everything in her own hands. In countries which are captive to the parliamentary system, the result is paralysis, as is the case in Poland, which, with 29 parties in parliament, is unable to carry out any essential economic reforms. There is no music without a good score, and then without a conductor who also knows how to choose the musicians. That is how it has been and how it will be.

[Jovic] One gets the impression that greater power is concentrated in bodies such as the Supreme State Council, the team of advisers, or this most recent Strategic Development Council than in the cabinet and Assembly.

[Tudjman] Come now, name me the presidents of the parliaments of the European states!

[Jovic] Domljan....

[Tudjman] So there, come now, is it not true that assemblies are representative bodies where laws and the budget are taken up? Advisers? Nonsense, how many are there? People write that there are more than 30, and there are not even 10 of them, and of those 10 there are not even three advisers in the real sense. The Council of State is made up of representatives of the cabinet and the Assembly in order to coordinate the effort of all those institutions and so that I get an opinion concerning some of the decisions I must make as president. The Strategic Development Council has no other role than to concern itself with development strategy so that intellectual potential is committed to this. If only I had institutes to deal with this? Some of them are still nests for communist and Yugounitarist views. The people brought together in the council are in their best years, from various fields, and their purpose is to reflect on development conceptions and to confront one another. There

is no reason for us not to create a country that represents progress and democracy, but this is not going to drop from heaven. The council can only help the cabinet so that in its concern with day-to-day problems and in making practical decisions it will always be operating in keeping with a long-term vision.

[Jovic] You have proclaimed the idea of ethnic reconciliation. Today, new ethnic divisions are threatening.

[Tudjman] My entire knowledge of Croatian history has brought me to that idea. Starcevic relied too much on the intellectuals. Radic went in the opposite direction, into a populist movement. Pavelic collided with the left-wingers, and indeed even with members of the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], and the Communists were particularly exclusive. We also applied that idea in government policy after the elections. Not all the members of the cabinet were from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. It is thanks to that idea that we have managed to achieve what we have, although with difficulties of another kind. Because of that kind of program, little room was left for opposition parties, which have no program either concerning social welfare or the government, and that is why everything comes down to a more or less pure oppositionism, opposition for the sake of opposition, adoption of the manner which we see in ST, GLOBUS, DANAS, this SLOBODNA DALMACIJA of yours. What is it? Remnants of the old and attachment to a policy which is objectively aimed at bringing down Tudjman and our policy. That means that they do not like the policy of an independent Croatia, but something else. They are fortunate to have control in the news media, so that they make a lot of noise, but actually this is a small, very small group which has no support either in the people or in the intelligentsia.

[Jovic] Do you think that the HDZ will get fewer votes in the next election than in the last one?

[Tudjman] The HDZ will get more votes. All the rest together will not get even 30 percent. And that regardless of all the shortcomings of the HDZ. But it is the HDZ with its program that has made all of this possible. Where were they, what were they offering? And the people have a very good sense of all that!

[Jovic] How would you take a loss in the presidential election?

[Tudjman] I am prepared to accept the will of the people, whatever it is. Whatever blame or credit attaches to me is related to the Croatian state. I have devoted my entire life to that idea. They invited me to foreign universities, but I knew that I must remain with my people to the end, with its vision and desire, and that only here with the people could I do something. Outside, you can only be some kind of Djilas. As far as that is concerned, I am content. But now, tell me who could take over the state, and if there is anyone serious, I would gladly be his adviser or—still better—I would leave him with my unfinished manuscripts and journal notes. That does not mean that such an individual will not turn up tomorrow, but I do not see him today.

[Jovic] Many people are annoyed today by your political style: the airplane, this villa, the pomp....

[Tudjman] As if I needed that! These are the most ordinary things with which a state represents itself. Tomorrow, someone else will be flying in that plane, someone else will be sitting in this room. Nowhere does the head of state travel on ordinary airlines and sit in just an ordinary office. All of that has a certain political function. They say—Tudjman plays tennis, as though that is supposed to be evidence of I know not what. But for years now I have been maintaining my physical and mental condition once a week. Bush's jogging, for example, does not bother anyone.

[Jovic] The prosecutor has filed three charges that have to do with you as president. One because of slander (Paraga), the other two because of insults (FERAL, Torbarina). Did he ask you before he decided to do that?

[Tudjman] He did not ask me, just as they did not ask me when they released Arkan. I would not have released him, although they attributed that to me.

[Jovic] And would you as a citizen have filed those charges?

[Tudjman] I have no time even to follow everything that is being written and said. But as a newsman you know that a heavy penalty is paid even in the most democratic countries for lies and slander, and that newspapers even go under on that account.

[Jovic] Your relations with Matica Hrvatska have cooled somewhat?

[Tudjman] Absolutely not! My relations with many people in the Matica are excellent; I have excellent cooperation with many people. There were three vice presidents at my birthday party in the Writers Society. It is just a matter of Matica Hrvatska being headed by a man who has different views on questions of creating the state and developing democracy.

[Jovic] And relations with the academy?

[Tudjman] I do not know where you got that. Someone wrote about me that I was Bakaric's candidate for the economy. No, I was the candidate of Krleza's circle and in 1965 Rankovic forbade my becoming a member. Bakaric had accused me of nationalism back in 1964, and in 1967 he wrote that I had created the social climate in which the declaration was possible. I was recently nominated once again to the HAZU [Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts]. I said no, because that would mean electing me to membership because I am president. Aside from that—perhaps this came out in public—in February, people came to me from the presidency of the academy with the idea of preparing some kind of symposium on the topic "What Kind of Croatia Do We Want," at which there would be some 500 participants. Papers would have been delivered by people from abroad or from within the country who had no role in creating an independent Croatia or who were even critical of that idea. I said: The question of what kind of

Croatia we want will be decided by those of us who created it, with all the intellectual powers of the people. And that position was also taken up by the presidency. I am in favor of pluralism, of reconciliation, but I am a man of principle and resolute when I think that essential Croatian interests are involved. In all my meditations and historical research, I have experienced the tragedy of the Croatian cause, and ultimately I have done so through my own personal experience. The earliest thing I remember from my childhood is that the police took my father off to prison after some election....

[Box, p 4]

The Croatian Army in Knin

[Tudjman] Acceptance of international conventions concerning protection of minorities and ethnic communities was one of the preconditions for Croatia's recognition. It is in that way that the international community put the Serbs in Croatia in a position of accepting the status of a minority, to which Belgrade policy has never consented. Objectively, the position of the Serbs changed after the elections, and particularly after this aggressive war in which only a portion of the Serbs were deceived, but a portion could not contemplate any other position than one with special rights. With the departure of the Yugoslav Army, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, with the collapse of the idea of an expanded Serbia, the Serbs objectively cannot count on what they once had, regardless of the legislative enactment, they cannot count on a privileged status. We are giving the Serbs the opportunity of an equal life and all ethnic rights according to the standards of the civilized world. Nothing more nor less than that! And as far as Croats in those regions are concerned, I ask you, how can their position be threatened in an independent and sovereign Croatia? And there is something else that is quite certain. Every Croatian person will be returned to his home and heart, and the question is whether the Serbian extremist who killed and robbed his neighbor Croat and burned his house will want to go back? And, of course, he will not be able to go back even if he wants to!

There is no statute of limitations on war crimes. Here is something else that must be borne in mind: We did not accept the point about permanent demilitarization of those areas. Tomorrow, we will have our own army even in Knin. All those areas also have to go through a demographic renewal in keeping with their geopolitical position. Knin is a key point between Dalmatian and Pannonian Croatia, and we can never again allow any kind of uncertainty there, and once again to have to deal with any Babic or Matic. They realized that in the outside world, and that is why they withdrew their proposal for permanent demilitarization.

[Box, p 4]

I Stand Behind Graz and Split

[Jovic] Do you stand behind those talks in Graz or those in Split?

[Tudjman] I stand behind both. After all, they are not at odds with one another, as is usually thought. The talks in Graz were conducted by Croatian and Serbian representatives along the line of the Lisbon resolutions. Cutiheiro proposed bilateral talks. They were aimed above all at cessation of the war. The Croatian side was again in a weaker position, although in a much better position than Croatia was at the beginning of the war. Which means the main purpose of the talks was to stop further casualties and at the same time possibly remove any reasons for waging war. I will tell you something which can now be written about. The Croats in the Bosnian Sava valley, when the Serbs proclaimed their "republic," wanted to join Croatia. In the interest of the policy we are conducting, which above all signifies achievement of the interests of Croatia and the Croatian people, always relying on international politics and international principles, I rejected that.

[Jovic] And the talks in Split?

[Tudjman] Well, we accept a confederation of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which guarantees Croatian rights and leads toward stopping the war and a permanent solution. We are not intoxicated about borders on the Drina. Even if someone gave Croatia that border, we would then have two million Serbs and two million Muslims, and again we would have to expend all our strength resolving ethnic problems. We want the Croatian people to be sovereign on its territory, and we want good common normal relations with all neighbors.

Tudjman's 'Untruths' in Interview Criticized

92BA1155B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Ivan Zvonimir Cicak: "Tudjman: Zagreb Fax"]

[Text] The last time I traveled in the direction of Split, which was around Easter, a good friend of mine who happens to be a high-level official of the incumbent party, but now is a bit out of favor because his views are "wild," asked me whether there was really any need or point in writing any more about Tudjman and everything he is doing. That is, is it not a bit pretentious to turn a large portion of my "epic" creative opus into criticism of Tudjman, which various political parasites on the Croatian political scene then turn into some kind of envy or hatred?

I agreed with him that even the kind of political position of critic, which I have assumed, cannot in "normal" civilized society be reduced solely to criticism of the president of the republic. But in a country in which the president of the moment has turned himself into the measure of all things, he simply compels political opponents of his style of political activity and reflection to mainly take a critical view of him, because by his authoritarianism he has reduced the other bodies of government in Croatia precisely to a mere transmission belt.

That is, it is clear as day, and this is evident from the text of the interview that NEDELJNA DALMACIJA published with the president of the moment, and which in keeping with democratic custom was reprinted in large part by "wild" SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, regardless of the fact that he reproaches it for being an enemy both of Tudjman and of everything that we might call Tudjmanism.

Image and Achievements

Even in this interview, as elsewhere, Tudjman showed that he has reduced the Croatian Assembly to the measure of a large "collective Tudjman," and the cabinet to a small "collective Tudjman," while the other bodies and corpuscles of government are actually miniature spiritual and political Tudjmanets scurrying about the circuit arena of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] political scene.

Having followed and analyzed carefully the "image and achievements of Comrade Franjo," over several decades in fact, directly and up close, I must actually say that his main problem is a confabulation in which by amazing psychological methods he himself is ultimately beginning to believe in the untruths which he passes off in order to buttress reflections about his image and achievements.

The best example of this is the section of the interview in which Tudjman says: "Because in 1967 I was excommunicated from public life, whether I was in prison or under house arrest...."

First of all, Tudjman was not excommunicated from public life in 1967, because he was speaking very frequently in public, he was publishing everything up until the end of 1974, and at that time he was even a member of the managing board of Matica Hrvatska.

As for his famous imprisonment, I must say that a big lie has been launched concerning that, and that came from his own mouth in an interview he gave before the elections to POLET of Zagreb, and that to one of his biographers, Butkovic, in which he struck off several major falsehoods.

First, Franjo Tudjman was never under house arrest, but moved freely about Zagreb like all the other political exiles, such as Savka, Tripalo, Marko Veselica, who was the most notorious, and others.

If Tudjman pronounced house arrest against himself and perceived the fact that he could not sit in the front row on the public stage, when his idea of himself was that we should, as some kind of house arrest, then this is a matter of his mental attitude toward the reality of life.

I must mention that I had occasion at that time to visit the present president of the moment very freely, that he and his wife would stop by my workshop at No. 6, Kaptol, that he regularly made pilgrimages to Savka Dabčević-Kucar, who at the time was the "queen of the Croats," and to other leaders in 1971.

Is it not precisely the fact of his once having made pilgrimages to the important Croatian figures of the time, compared to whom he was in the political minor leagues, the root of his almost pathological hatred of Croatian fighters whom he now—in bolshevik style—lumps together in the basket of enemies of Croatia, because they do not bow and scrape to him?

Time Spent in Prison

In that same interview, Tudjman uttered the most outright falsehood about his years of imprisonment, and then he declared that he was sentenced to two years in prison the first time and four years the second time, which is simply not true.

In judicial practice, the sentence pronounced in the final verdict following an appeal by the appeal court, in this case, the Supreme Court of Croatia, is considered the true verdict fixing the actual length of the sentence.

The first time, in the first trial, which was held in 1972, Tudjman was sentenced to approximately a year in prison in a final verdict, but he actually spent only nine months in prison, i.e., the time he spent in custody before the trial was completed in the first instance.

In the second trial, Tudjman was actually sentenced to four years in prison in the first instance, and then later this sentence was altered by verdict of the Supreme Court of Croatia, and after endless written pleading for mercy and proclaiming himself to be a sick man with very "amazing" diagnoses, he spent slightly more than a year in the Lepoglava Prison, where he was given special treatment that did not differ essentially from the position of someone like Gotovac, who was in prison at the same time and in the same prison, or even someone like Veselica and dozens of other political oppositionists.

In the same interview, Tudjman also spoke about his atheistic and agnostic outlook, that is, about not being Catholic and not being Christian, right before the elections began, with the help of Gavran, who at the time was a copy editor at GLAS KONCILA, he managed through that same newspaper to fit himself with the halo of a Catholic, publishing a photograph of his kneeling before the cross on Good Friday in Marija Bistrica, just as Gavran made it possible for him to deliver a speech to Catholic priests in Vinkovci, and after that no one else was ever invited to speak on such an occasion, which are elements very indicative of the real role of the involvement and noninvolvement of parts of the Catholic Church in Croatia's political life.

In the same style which he needs to emphasize the truthfulness of his own views, he will very democratically refer to discussions of the role of the president of the republic in a democratic state which are critical of his excessive authoritarianism, as "nothing more than nonsense about the exaggerated role of the president."

But Tudjman would provide the best confirmation of my view that he has set himself up as the measure of Croatia instead of Croatia being the measure of us all in a

sentence in which he says that the "position of the president usually depends on the individual who is the head of state."

This confirms the thesis that Tudjman is a political phenomenon of a person who by agile political manipulation and abuse of the Constitution and law has managed to install himself as an absolute ruler in the following way: First, with 60 percent of the vote he was elected a deputy to the Croatian Assembly in Dubrava Opcina under the socialist constitution, and then as such he was elected to be a member of the Croatian Presidency, and then he amended the law at that time to proclaim himself the permanent president of the Presidency, and then by amendment to the Constitution he proclaimed himself to be president with maximum powers, contrary to the Constitution itself. The transitional provisions of the constitutional law state as part of the Croatian Constitution that as president in the interregnum, governing apart from the Constitution, he has only the duties, but not the rights of the president of the republic.

Tudjman would even falsify the facts related to the European discussions of the role of the presidential system, and he would say that everywhere the trends are toward the presidential system, although world trends are precisely in the opposite direction, and even in France, which has such a very old tradition of presidential government, there is a plan to eliminate the presidential model of government.

The Assembly as a Servant

Tudjman really speaks about the Croatian Assembly with derisiveness in the manner which the Croatian Assembly in fact deserves, because it is supposed to be the supreme body of Croatian Government, and has been turned into the servant of the president at the moment. Tudjman said in the interview that "assemblies are representative bodies where they take up laws and the budget." If the Croatian Assembly has really been reduced only to what Tudjman says, and it obviously has, then it is clear why we look upon it more and more as a parrot and a collective machine for raising hands.

The fact that Tudjman speaks about the opposition having no social program and about all this being opposition for the sake of opposition is another piece of evidence that Tudjman is precisely the one who established the rigid criteria concerning the Croatian opposition and the media, which accounts for the operational activity in the field as a mere transmission belt.

At the same time, both the opposition and a large segment of the Croatian body politic are investigating with archeological curiosity where that notorious economic program is hidden which the HDZ announced even before the beginning of the elections, but no one can find it. Which is not to mention the social welfare program of the incumbent party, whose results are luxury, Viennese balls and concerts, new BMW's and apartments for the new privileged class, little airplanes

and boys from the ballet, Aladdin's magic carpet on airport runways on which Tudjman pilots himself to the kingdom of his dreams.

However, Tudjman has at the same time given Seks, the state prosecutor, the precise location of those principally to blame, who are, to be sure, a "small group," but this is obviously a case of "enemies who do not like the policy of an independent Croatia, but something else." They are SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, GLOBUS, DANAS, and SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. Tudjman immediately put all these media, as well as the opposition, in the basket of those who "objectively aim at bringing down the HDZ, bringing down Tudjman, that is, our policy."

He thereby clearly indicated to every citizen who has a gun or bomb that he can fire freely against these newspapers or oppositionists, because they are destroying the Croatian state, and are, then, Chetniks, and should be treated as such.

The acme of Tudjman's confabulatory triviality is contained in a sentence in which he asked Jovic, the newsman: "But, come on, tell me who could take over the state, and if there is anyone serious, I would gladly be his adviser...."

Woe be to the state which has only one "serious man" and to the people who at this moment has no competitors for the presidential palace, indeed, if it does not have at least some 20, and woe be to a nation in which the president so impudently assumes the identity of his entire party and people, and therefore the state as well.

As for the justification of the riding around in little airplanes and this cheap folkloric mania for ribbons, which Tudjman has imposed on Croatia, there really is

no need whatsoever to comment on all that because of the frivolous way in which Tudjman attempts to portray it as the result of a statesman's need.

One could write a great deal more of all this, such as Tudjman's announcement that his party will get more votes in the elections than in the last elections, which made it clear that the government does not intend to give up, because, as he says, everything that is against him actually wants to break up the unity of the HDZ and the Croatian people "by means of some worldwide Masonry."

The Opposition and the Media

Thus, the criminalization of political opponents has been taken to absurd lengths, as in that passage where he speaks about "organized diplomatic channels and hostile domestic propaganda."

What, then, remains for individuals who do not agree with this way of thinking? What remains for the opposition and the free media?

Either to pack their bags for the trip to prison or to pack their bags for exile, or to join in a common struggle to defend democracy against carcinomatous Tudjmanitis.

In that context, certain political leaders, who are craftily and nimbly using the determined struggle of others to somehow artificially improve their political rating, should understand that the stick has two ends and that their thrusting of the stick into the hands of the brave is a sword which will expose their cowardice.

So, I will go on writing about the president of the moment as long as he so abundantly and incessantly provides new occasions for it.

Slovene Leadership on Relationship With EC

92BA1181B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 27 Jun 92 p 4

[Letter from the leaders of the Slovene Government to the EC: "Slovenia With Europe in Europe"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 26 Jun—Today at a summit meeting in Lisbon, the leaders and foreign ministers of the EC and the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, received a letter addressed to them by President of the Presidency Milan Kucan, Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek, and Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. The contents of the letter are as follows:

"Excellency,

"By chance, the EC summit coincides with the first anniversary of the declaration of the independence of the Republic of Slovenia, which seems to us to be a particularly appropriate occasion for a Slovene message to the European Twelve. On this solemn occasion, we are sending you a glass of Slovene wine, with which we invite you to join in our celebration, at least from a distance. This drink is also a symbolic sign of gratitude for the efforts of your state and of the EC as a whole.

"Our fate has been linked since the beginning of independence with the actions and activities of the EC. We shaped this fate ourselves, but with your assistance. Without your assistance, Slovenia would not be what it is today: an independent, internationally recognized state, which wants the same thing that all peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of the EC, want: a peaceful life, productive coexistence with other peoples, economic prosperity, and democratic institutions that recognize neither permanent majorities nor permanent minorities.

"Slovenia belongs to European civilization, with which we are linked by culture and geography. We shared with Europe the Christian Middle Ages, Protestantism and the Reformation, and also the Counter-Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Baroque and Romantic periods, the flowering of nationalism, the Industrial Revolution, and finally the social revolution as well. Real socialism and the division of Europe after World War II into its democratic West and communist-bolshevist East drove us away from Europe after World War II, in which our fathers honorably fought against fascism on the side of the democratic world, until we identified ourselves with Europe again through the democratic elections in 1990. We founded Slovene democracy through culture. With particular pride we recited the Romantic classic Presern, who wrote mostly love poems, but in addition to them also composed 'A Toast,' which says, 'Long live all peoples who yearn to see a day without strife, when those bordering each other will not be enemies, just neighbors.' Those words are our state anthem today.

"In that year, which we passed through before the eyes of the world and also with the attention of the community, we Slovenes, united, resisted the political leadership of our former joint state and the attack by the 'Yugoslav

People's Army,' which also had to leave Slovenia because of your energetic intercession in Brioni. We established democratic institutions and created relative prosperity, so that our social and economic achievements can be compared with the achievements of our neighbors; they differ fundamentally from the achievements of the former state of Yugoslavia. We did not part from it in order to shut ourselves off from the world, but rather precisely because Yugoslavia did not allow us accelerated and independent development and equal cooperation with others, which today is the first rule of your and our Europe.

"Even today Slovenia, although peace prevails in it and although our fundamental longings have been fulfilled, is participating actively in the international action to halt the war in the region of the former Yugoslavia. We think that we can contribute to the success of the conference on Yugoslavia, and we agree completely with the findings of its arbitration commission. We are doing all of this in the spirit of the documents of the UN and the CSCE, of which we have become members, and we are also drawing guidelines for our policy from the Paris document and from the Helsinki process in general.

"As far as the EC is concerned, Slovenia already cooperated with it in the past; it realized most of the cooperation within the framework of the 'cooperation agreement' between the EC and Yugoslavia.

"Economically, Slovenia has traditionally been linked to the EC states, which account for almost two-thirds of total foreign trade and tourist traffic, and a good half of all financial, technological, and information flows, etc. In spite of these developed economic relations, we judge that a great deal can still be done through mutual efforts, which will benefit both sides.

"Slovenia has a considerable advantage among all the economies in a transition to a market economy: It has a relatively high social product (over \$12 billion), we earn almost half of the social product through exports, and 90 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises are in the private sector. We have a quite liberal foreign trade regime, and a well-educated population structure (6 percent of the population has at least a university diploma), with traditionally rich contacts and business experiences in the EC states.

"The Republic of Slovenia is likewise accelerating the introduction of all elements of an open market economy, taking into consideration the principles and orientations of the EC. We want to accelerate Slovenia's integration into the Community as much as possible, and we request that you support us in this.

"We believe, Excellency, that you agree with our assessment that the case of the Republic of Slovenia is a completely unique one, which deserves special treatment. We wish to assure you that we are capable, with a very high degree of unity among our citizens and in a very short time, of successfully completing the formation of the new political and economic system and fulfilling all the conditions and procedures for inclusion in the

process of forming a European political and economic union. With your support, we are consequently prepared and able to become a full member of the EC soon.

"Accept, Excellency, expressions of our high esteem."

[signed] President of the Presidency Milan Kucan
Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek
Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel.

Slovene People's Party Holds Congress

92BA1181D Ljubljana SLOVENE in Slovene
29 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Janez Vuk: "The Slovene People's Party Congress Confirmed Its Popular Orientation"]

[Text] Ljubljana—Saturday's congress of the Slovene People's Party [SLS] fully confirmed the popular orientation that the party's leadership formulated in the period since the last congress.

The SLS, which emerged from the former Slovene Peasants' Alliance [SKZ], has experienced considerable changes since its emergence until today. The original SKZ was not a party in the real sense of the word, but rather a professional association that was supposed to advocate the interests of the farming profession in what was then still a one-party system. That period was relatively short, since with the collapse of the party monopoly, the need for it to be transformed into a real political party was quickly demonstrated.

The program orientations and the other documents that were adopted at Saturday's SLS congress indicate that the SLS wants to be a modern party, within which the Peasants' Alliance is only one of the factions, although for a long time to come it will probably be the central interest alliance and will set a definite tone for the party. From now on the party will also have worker, women's, economic, Green, consumer, youth, retiree, and other narrower interest alliances. The party's area of interest has also been expanded to all nationally important political problems.

The departure of Ivan Oman, who was its president from the establishment of the original SKZ in 1988 until his resignation from it at the beginning of May 1992, did not have any obvious influence upon the delegates or the course of the congress. The problem over which Oman resigned, namely the similarity between the programs and orientations of the SLS and the SKD [Christian Democratic Party], which in Oman's opinion would force a merger of the two parties, was not even mentioned at the congress. The membership is obviously convinced that with its traditional agricultural orientation, supplemented with the newer general political one, the party has a sufficiently specific constituency that it can firmly rely on. There were thus virtually no discussions of the party's general ideology. Along with the already well-known emphasis that in its activity the SLS is proceeding from the Christian ethos, one could only hear a request from one of the participants in the discussion that the party should be as little ideological as

possible and as central as possible. Our general impression is that the emphasis in the party's activity will be on the problems of the Slovene countryside in all its aspects, in regard to which one should of course take into account the fact that today's countryside is closely interwoven with the city, since to a great extent it is approaching the economic, social, cultural, and other standards that were primarily urban in the past. Certain specific features nevertheless remain.

The SLS's new program thus puts great emphasis on economic developmental and agricultural policy, environmental protection, the harmonious regional development of Slovenia, and land management. The program likewise emphasizes social policy, in which particular attention is devoted to labor and employment, disability and health insurance, the family, and health care. The program also devotes particular attention to education and science, the protection of human rights, foreign and domestic policy, defense, culture, sports, and youth and women.

Within the framework of economic policy, the party will strive for a tax system that will encourage development, a competitive and nonmonopolistic banking system, the rehabilitation and appropriate privatization of the latter, an interest rate that will be lower than the average profit rate, a nonmonopolistic economic structure, a stable tolar, and a noninflationary monetary policy.

In the area of agriculture, the party is advocating an eco-socio-market model, and is rejecting an exaggerated economically liberal and ecologically fundamentalist approach. It is advocating rationalization of the processing industry, which is making agricultural products excessively expensive on the way to the final consumer.

The congress also adopted several resolutions which represent application of the new program, and apply to developmental, youth, social, and economic policy.

Opposition Parties Coordinate Their Activities

92BA1181E Ljubljana SLOVENE in Slovene
27 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Marjana Novak: "Need for an Alliance of the Opposition Parties"]

[Text] At a press conference given by opposition representatives on 23 June, among other things, the opposition parties' position on the Slovene Christian Democrats' [SKD] proposal to rename the Demos Deputies' Club as the Opposition Deputies' Club was also presented.

Unfortunately, there really were no representatives of the SKD at the press conference (not because of a lack of time, but rather because of the current absence of almost all the party officials) to explain the SKD's position on the use of the name Demos and the opposition parties' coordinating group.

At the first meeting of the opposition parties' coordinating group on 22 May in Brezovica, the following resolutions were unanimously approved:

1. Cooperation is necessary for the sake of common interests.
2. We will continue talks on forming a coalition after talks have been conducted within the parties.
3. Until then, it is necessary to introduce regular weekly coordination in a small group.
4. The cooperation of the parties participating is based on the continuity of implementation of the Demos program.
5. The obcina Demos committees are to continue to exist, and are to be established where they do not yet exist.
6. The deputies of all four parties are to participate in the Demos Deputies' Club.

In a public statement by SKD President Lojze Peterle on 25 May, the following was written:

"The four parties, which are now opposition parties, remain faithful to the Demos program, which has not yet been fully implemented. They also have a common interest in holding elections as soon as possible. Renaming (e.g., New Demos) is not necessary for that purpose, nor is seeking a new leader for the opposition; what is needed is the ongoing coordination of work, especially in the Assembly. The interest in having Demos continue to operate at the obcina level is also understandable.

"We Slovene Christian Democrats do not know where and when we thought that 'the need for the opposition coordinating group is no longer inevitable.' That opinion would be contrary to the resolutions of the coordinating group.

"At the meeting of the Executive Committee, there was no mention of withdrawing from the coordinating group, or of its insignificance. The statement after the meeting said, 'We oppose equating the opposition parties' coordinating group with the previous Demos coalition.'

"We will therefore propose to the Demos Deputies' Club that it be renamed as the Opposition Deputies' Club.

"We Slovene Christian Democrats, noting the fact that all our newspaper firms are independent, are surprised at how interpretations of the same statements can be so different."

Slovene Exports Increasing, Imports Declining

92BA1181C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Bozena Kriznik: "Exports Are Still Increasing"]

[Text] *In the first five months of this year, Slovene exports exceeded exports during the same period last year, and imports were reduced by more than one-fourth; balanced with Croatia.*

Ljubljana, 29 Jun—Judging by the data from the Republic Statistics Institute, exports of Slovene goods abroad also increased in May. The total Slovene exports

in the first five months of this year exceeded exports during the same period last year, while this year's imports from January through May inclusive were more than one-fourth more modest than imports in the first five months of last year. The influence of the economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] can already be recognized in trade with the republics of the former Yugoslavia: Trade with Serbia and Montenegro decreased noticeably in May.

In May 1992 Slovenia exported \$404 million in goods, and imported \$341 million (the data for this year are summarized by the statistics in the tables from the Bank of Slovenia, and reflect imports and exports without value added). Thus, May's exports were 7.4 percent higher than in May 1991, and monthly imports were 11.2 percent lower than last year's in that month. Exports covered 118 percent of imports. If we put the entire period from January to May under the microscope, we see that the five months' exports were worth \$1,684 million, and imports grew to \$1,436 million by the end of May. In comparison with last year's five-month period, it turns out that this year exports were 1.4 percent higher, and imports 25.9 percent lower. The degree to which exports covered imports during this period remained the same as in the first four months of last year. For the sake of comparison, in the first five months of 1991 Slovene imports considerably exceeded exports, so that exports only covered 86 percent of imports.

According to the comments on export trends from the Republic of Slovenia's Institute for Statistics, we can expect that in the coming months, this year's total exports will continue to increase in comparison with last year's cumulative exports, because of the influence of the small transfer of customs declarations this year. With time, this influence will be increasingly smaller.

In May, the most pronounced increase was in Slovene exports to other states, which also includes the former socialist states, among them our most important trading partner, Russia. The share of exports to these states grew from 8.8 percent in the first four months of this year to 13.8 of total imports during the five-month period. Statistics explains this as a result of new and more extensive transactions.

Analyzing the structure of imports by economic purposes, one can observe that in May there was a slight increase in the share of imports of equipment and consumer goods at the expense of imports of semifinished products.

A special chapter in Slovenia's trade is trade with the former Yugoslav republics. This month, the statistics are also showing separately for the first time the data on trade with Macedonia, so that actually, only Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina still remain under the heading "rest of Yugoslavia." In view of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is primarily trade with the FRY that is expressed in these data. The May data indicate that trade has declined considerably; exports to the

"remainder of Yugoslavia" in May were only worth \$29 million (37.1 percent of April exports to that area), and the amount of imports from there was also the same (a good half of the April exports). It can be expected that in the coming months there will not even be any trade with these republics, unless the international community cancels the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

In May Slovenia exported approximately as much to Croatia as it imported from there (about \$79 million in exports and \$77 million in imports), thus somewhat reducing the degree to which this year's total exports covered imports. For the time being, the statistics do not yet vouch for the realism of the data on trade with Macedonia. This time, in fact, the amounts are very low, which is probably also a consequence of the inconsistent completion of customs declarations.

Foreign Trade in May 1992
(millions of dollars at current exchange rate)

	Value in May 1992	May 1992/May 1991 Index	Value Jan-May 1992	Jan-May 1992/Jan-May 1991 Index
Exports	404	107.4	1,684	101.4
Imports	341	88.8	1,436	74.1
Coverage of imports	118		117	

Trade With the Former Yugoslav Republics in May 1992
(thousands of dollars at current exchange rate)

	May 1992 Value	Jan-May 1992 Value
Croatia		
—Exports	78,566	353,445
—Imports	76,793	307,516
—Coverage	102	114
Macedonia		
—Exports	665	665
—Imports	463	463
—Coverage	144	144
Rest of Yugoslavia		
—Exports	29,243	362,521
—Imports	29,418	246,948
—Coverage	99	147

Source: Republic of Slovenia's Institute for Statistics

Government Officials on Balkan Situation

AU1307165992 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP
in Hungarian 9 Jul 92 p 2

[Interview with Ljupce Naumovski, member of the Macedonian Government, and Ismet Aganovic, member of the Bosnian Government, by Geza Mucsi; place and date not given: "A Cry for Help From the Balkans"]

[Text] *Bosnia-Herzegovina is still loud with the tumult of battle, although the world is promising international cooperation to help settle the situation. The atmosphere is explosive in Macedonia, too. Muslim refugees are flooding the republic, which is trying to become independent. Ljupce Naumovski and Ismet Aganovic described their problems to PESTI HIRLAP.*

[Mucsi] Similarly to Hungary, Macedonia also accepts and supports the Bosnian refugees. What are your hopes in this issue?

[Naumovski] The refugees are a great problem for Macedonia, but this issue is not our greatest problem. For months we have been trying to achieve recognition by the EC. Unfortunately, this has not yet happened.

[Mucsi] When can Skopje be given a positive answer?

[Naumovski] We are fighting and hoping. I believe that we have already proved to Europe that we deserve a place in the continent's common home, which is also indicated by the fact that we have helped many thousands of Bosnian refugees in the past weeks. The recognition of our independence is forthcoming and solely depends on a European consensus. We are already present at some international conferences as a sovereign country and, fortunately, there is no return from this direction.

[Mucsi] How far have you progressed in your talks with Greece?

[Naumovski] Unfortunately, for the time being, the Greek leadership is unbending and does not accept our initiatives on starting bilateral talks. The EC also has to help us in convincing our neighbor about recognizing Macedonia. In my view, the debates over the use of the Macedonia name can sooner or later be settled.

[Mucsi] Serbian President Milosevic proposed a confederation of Serbia and Greece, but Greece said no to this. What is the view of the Macedonian Government on this issue?

[Naumovski] Milosevic has been making impossible suggestions for years, and no one takes him seriously anymore. He is gradually losing all the trust and patience of his people. There is no need to comment on his initiatives because we have long learned who is responsible for this war.

[Mucsi] According to President Kiro Gligorov, Macedonia will be recognized once the war also spreads there.

[Naumovski] I do not know what to say to this, because becoming involved in the war would be a great misfortune for us. Hopefully, Europe is mature enough to solve its problems peacefully and, at the same time, recognize the newly formed small states.

[Mucsi] Macedonia does not yet have a war but more than 1.5 million people have fled Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the bloodshed. What sort of positive turn of events can you envision?

[Aganovic] We can only hope. The number of refugees and deportations is increasing every day, and the EC is not doing anything about this; I could say that it is unconcerned. We have come to the view that only a foreign military intervention can stop the war. However, all the foreigners do is hold meetings, while blood is being shed here and the whole country is in ruins. There are no intact roads, bridges, or hospitals. Although the airlift of aid has been established, this is not at all enough because we need further large quantities of foreign aid.

[Mucsi] Mainly Muslims are fleeing from Bosnia, and they are also being deported by the Serbian free troops. Where are you expecting aid from other than Europe?

[Aganovic] I recently visited Saudi Arabia. I held discussions with responsible officials, and it was my pleasure to find out that they would be happy to help us. We are mainly expecting financial help because Saudi Arabia has already been financing humanitarian aid for Bosnia. We have also been promised in Riyadh that Saudi Arabian experts will be sent to Sarajevo to help rebuild the country once the war is over. I was authorized to coordinate the work of the Arab experts.

Serbian Foreign Minister on National Minorities

AU1407062292 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 6 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Jozsef Szabo in Budapest; date not given: "The Hungarian Minority Has No Reason To Worry"]

[Text] *Vladislav Jovanovic attended the CSCE parliamentary general meeting in Budapest, and he gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG.*

[Szabo] Everyone is hoping for an end to the war.

[Jovanovic] I hope that the war is coming nearer to its end. This is in Yugoslavia's interest and is the single goal of our policy. The crisis would be resolved in one or two weeks if it only depended on Yugoslavia, or Serbia and Montenegro. However, this is a more complicated problem and it should not be approached one-sidedly. Foreign countries could help most by showing a positive and peace-seeking attitude toward the former Yugoslav republics, especially the opposing sides in Bosnia. We are ready to do so and the Serbs in Bosnia also reject the war. They support a just and lasting settlement. It would be good if the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia also accepted this.

[Szabo] The world blames Yugoslavia for the refugees from Bosnia. Deportation is being mentioned.

[Jovanovic] This is out of the question. There are 400,000 refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in Yugoslavia. Most of them are Serbs who left Bosnia because they were threatened with death or because the Muslim and Croatian authorities simply evicted them.

There are Croatian refugees and even 40,000 Muslims who receive the same treatment as the Serbian refugees. We have informed the UN High Commission for Refugees in Belgrade about all Bosnian refugees. The refugees are asked at the High Commission whether they want to stay in Yugoslavia or leave for another country. Their wishes are respected.

[Szabo] What will happen to the people in the Serbian Krajinas?

[Jovanovic] People in the Serbian Krajinas have been placed under UN supervision because the Croatian authorities are threatening the life of the population there and peace has been endangered. Negotiations are being started on the status of the people in Krajina.

[Szabo] What is Serbia doing to stop the bloodshed?

[Jovanovic] We did much by not starting the war and not even participating in it, although we are constantly being accused of aggression. We did not have any soldiers at all in Croatia or Bosnia. Serbia does not even have an army. We condemn the war that is being fought in Bosnia by three nations. We called upon the warring sides to stop the hostilities immediately and unconditionally. Yugoslavia supports a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

[Szabo] How can the issue of Bosnian and Serbian Muslims be resolved?

[Jovanovic] The Muslims, just like the Croatians, are our brethren! We are one people and we speak the same language. It is true that recently both the Croatians and the Muslims have been presenting themselves as a separate ethnic group. We respect this. Muslims in Bosnia have equal rights with the Serbs and Croatians living there. They must come to a common agreement. Muslim citizens in Serbia have equal rights. Muslims living in Sandzak, which is part of the republic, are actually Serbs whose ancestors were converted to Islam centuries ago. Today, the freedom of worship and the preservation of their cultural identity is ensured. However, autonomy for this area is out of the question because the Muslims constitute less than half of the population.

[Szabo] Albanians in Kosovo voted for independence at their last elections. How does the Serbian Government treat this issue?

[Jovanovic] Albanians in Kosovo have always been a national minority in Yugoslavia. A minority does not have the right to establish a state. This right is not ensured by either the CSCE documents or the United Nations. Their elections and the declaration of an independent Kosovo were illegal. They violated Serbia's sovereignty although we granted them territorial and

cultural autonomy. We have tried to hold negotiations with them four times in the past two months. They rejected our proposal. Their independence efforts are anticonstitutional and they will never be implemented. If they are, then the CSCE countries that have national minorities will become endangered.

[Szabo] Vojvodina is free of such efforts; nevertheless, armed people are trying to expel the Croatians and Hungarians who are living there. Can this be prevented?

[Jovanovic] We condemn tyranny and taking the law into one's own hands. No one can act arbitrarily or threaten others, in fact, nor can they bear arms or wear uniforms. Yugoslavia and Serbia are states of law and order. They guarantee security for everyone and take firm measures against people who violate the law. The Hungarian national minority, just as anyone else, has no reason to be worried. In the past three months, we have arrested some 1,700 people carrying weapons and wearing a uniform illegally.

[Szabo] What are your views on current relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary?

[Jovanovic] Hungary has been our neighbor for a very long time. We have many reasons to foster the development of better, more stable, and more friendly cooperation. My most recent talks with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Jeszenszky were encouraging, and the hope was expressed that, refraining from using the momentary weaknesses of the other side, we would make a joint effort to establish conditions that will soon remind us of the times when we were a model of fruitful and complex cooperation between two countries.

Delegates on Confederation of Greece, Serbia

92BA1192B Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 27-28 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by S.P.S., M.T., and V.M.: "What Representatives of the Assembly of Serbia Think About the Confederation of Greece and Serbia: Everything Is Possible, but..."]

[Text] *Opinions vary from one that everything is possible under the Constitution of Yugoslavia (Vukasin Jokanovic) to another that such a proposal is frivolous and appropriate for a president who does not deal professionally with politics.*

Numerous opinions and comments could be heard yesterday in the Serbian Assembly about the statement of Slobodan Milosevic that Greece and Yugoslavia are entering into a confederation. We asked several representatives for their opinions.

Vukasin Jokanovic (SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]): It is possible under the Constitution of Yugoslavia. And the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] can enter into a confederation with whomever it wants. The Serbian and Greek people are connected by numerous historical ties, and in these crucial days for the Serbian and other peoples in the Balkans, all proposals and ideas that lie in the direction of the lasting and fair establishment of

peace and stability in the Balkans are very important. However, this idea now needs to be considered and viewed from all sides.

Mihajlo Markovic (SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement]): Such a proposal is frivolous and appropriate for a president who does not deal professionally with politics.

Milan Paroski (NS [National Assembly]): When the proposal has already been mentioned that Greece and Yugoslavia should enter into a confederation, then I hope for a federation with Macedonia too, because otherwise it would be an impractical confederation, connected only by air, or a fairy-tale confederation.

Mirko Petrovic (DS [State Secretariat]): I think that such statements cannot be made without adequate advance preparations and consultations in the most important political institutions of the neighboring countries. And the parliament of Serbia should also be consulted.

But at this time, because of the terrible international pressure and those wielding power in the state of Serbia, it is clear that this will remain only a marketing move and idea.

Momcilo Trajkovic (SPS): The Balkans will cease to be a powder keg precisely with the creation of a Balkan confederation; this is an inevitability. However, one of the questions in all this is the Albanian question, which, conditionally said, connects Greece and Serbia and Macedonia and Montenegro and Albania, just as the Serbian-Macedonian question connects this interest.

In any case, without the resolution of the Macedonian and Albanian question, such a confederation cannot be established.

Pal Sandor (DZVM [Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians]): This is the same as a confederation with Bangladesh or Nepal. Classic fooling around by Serbian politics and a diversion of attention from important to secondary themes.

Vojislav Seselj (SRS [Serbian Radical Party]): In principle I am against any kind of confederation since it has been shown that no confederation in the world has been able to survive for long. But better relations with Greece and cooperation in all fields are all necessary.

Oskar Kovac (SPS): A confederation, like any loose relation, is nevertheless a state. By means of this confederation, the FRY would have a relatively direct access not only to the market but also to membership in the EC. It is clear that in such a joint state, the FRY would secure a permanent route to the Aegean Sea and the Near East. Many questions on the nature of economic interaction remain open. The first steps are the most difficult. I must admit that I fear the optimism of which the previous sentences smell.

[Box, p 2]

When America Can...

Goran Percevic, president of the Young Socialists of Serbia and member of the Main Council of the Socialist Party, and since recently also a representative in the Assembly of Yugoslavia, says about the confederation between Yugoslavia and Greece: "The politics of integration have been one of the basic thrusts from the beginning in the activities of the current Serbian and Yugoslav leadership, both in the domestic as well as in the international plan. The idea of the alliance with Greece should also be viewed in this context."

Sandzak Migrations Described as 'Absurd'

92BA1192C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jun 92 p 12

[Article by Z. Saponjic: "Sandzak Absurdities: Politics in Refugees' Sacks"]

[Text] *In the past several months, it is claimed in the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], 50,000 Muslims have left Sandzak; at the same time several thousand refugees from Bosnia have arrived; strange routes for gold and foreign exchange.*

The main Novi Pazar square, bordered on the outside by two arched buildings, and within distinguished by the Vrbak oriental hotel and an old tavern, is a witness nowadays to something that it has probably not ever seen before.

Almost every day, most often before noon, several buses come out of here into the bright light that are crammed with people spurred on the trip by fear and, as one officially knows how to say in circles of the Sandzak SDA, "the oppression of bearded Serbian reservists from Pestar plateau." In the afternoon, buses and passenger cars are also full of people, but those who are coming to find refuge and salvation there arrive at the same square and surrounding streets.

Three Columns of Travelers

According to figures that SDA leaders often use in their reports and statements for the press, over 50,000 Muslims "under the threat of direct war danger and preparations for massacres of the Muslim people by Chetniks" have left Sandzak in the past five to six months. Their final destinations have most often been Turkey, then Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Holland, and other countries of the West where the status of refugees can be obtained. At the same time, Novi Pazar Red Cross figures have shown that more than 1,600 refugees, mainly Muslims, have arrived in this city since the beginning of the war in Bosnia. The Red Cross also mentions that this number is far higher, at least several times higher, because the majority of refugees do not register because they have found shelter with relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

This is absurd, everyone in this city admits it, and it is visible at first glance. At the same time Novi Pazar is a

place from which people are fleeing in great numbers because of the war, and a city in which those fleeing the war find shelter and safety.

What is really happening in Novi Pazar, and why are its refugee trips so strange and illogical?

It is difficult to find a spokesman in the "Sandzak capital" who is willing to explain what is happening. However, in secrecy and in confidence (names are too expensive a commodity in these areas nowadays to be mentioned just like that), some other details can be obtained. And they show that there is too much sadness and misfortune, and there are still more homeless and victims of fire, arriving in Pazar in trucks and buses from eastern Bosnia, to make any great objections. However, the reasons for those who are leaving for the West, claim the same sources, are not so obvious, at least in all cases. Stories are increasingly spreading in Novi Pazar to the effect that among the "refugees" there is a part of those for whom the "oppression of the reservists" is only a cover, and for whom smuggling is becoming an ever more lucrative job under the blockade. Tickets to German cities are expensive, but the road is more open with refugees, one arrives at destinations more easily, controls are more yielding, so the calculation exists.

Businessmen Only Satisfied

In another rather sizeable group, there are a number of those who, instead of their heads, are saving earned marks, dollars, and gold, real fortunes that are hidden in the buses' luggage racks among the refugees' things and most often end up in Turkish or Western banks.

Last, but not in numbers, are those who are really afraid for their heads and take their children out in the world away from the inflamed Sandzak regions. Whether they serve some third party as a cover is less essential.

However, all this could be put in a small basket if politics had not also stuck its fingers deep into the refugees' sacks and bags and if new quarrels and divisions among Novi Pazar politicians did not come from everything. From the Serbian side, charges are being heard at the SDA's expense that the Muslim party, in its political marketing and the charges that it is sending every day to the addresses of Western institutions, is increasingly including among the refugees who are fleeing for a reason, those who have no connection with them. Only to achieve the greatest possible effect this way.

"Those who are coming from Bosnia negate these who are leaving for the West. Things are not quite clean here. I don't see a reason why someone from Novi Pazar is fleeing if other people find refuge and safety in it," briefly explains Radenko Jokovic, president of the District Council of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] of Raska Region.

Rasim Ljajic, SDA secretary, replies to all this with a countercharge: "A plan for ethnic cleansing of the territory is in effect in Sandzak. With the departure of 50,000 people, the demographic picture of these areas has already changed greatly."

"People are fleeing because of fear, but it is not just fear of war, but in many cases also fear of hunger. The absurd exists, but it can be explained by the fact that for part of the refugees from Bosnia, this is only a transit station on the way to Turkey," says Ljajic.

In the meantime, owners of private tourist agencies, which are organizing the departure of refugees, are increasing the number of lines to "ports of safety," buying new buses, and—rubbing their hands in satisfaction.

[Box, p 12]

Yesterday—250 Refugees

During the course of the day yesterday, five buses with more than 250 refugees left the main Novi Pazar square for Munich and Sweden. By way of illustration, a ticket for Sweden, in the organization of one of the private travel agencies, costs 240 marks, plus \$110 for the ship.

Questions on Croatia's Aggression Toward Bosnia

92BA1160B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
22 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Zeljko Vukovic: "The 'Lilies' Are Wilting Under the 'Chessboard'"]

[Text] The political and military alliance of B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and Croatia—which Alija Izetbegovic concluded with Franjo Tudjman by telephone—is only an unsuccessful attempt to give legitimacy to a despicable and untenable reality and thereby to provide at least a temporary defense against those alarmed people who are issuing warnings as to the full danger and disastrous nature of the fact that B-H is becoming more and more Croatia with every passing hour.

The reality is undeniable—western Herzegovina, the Sava valley, to some extent even so-called "Franciscan Bosnia" (Bugojno, Travnik, Kiseljak, Busovaca, Zenica...), are territories on which Tudjman's commissioners hold both the military and civilian authority. The legitimate bodies of government—put in office in elections—have been quietly removed, and they have been replaced by members of the "Croatian revolutionary government." In those areas of B-H (more than 30 percent of the republic territory), the emblem of the state is the "chessboard." The B-H crest and flag (metaphorically referred to as "the lilies") are nowhere to be found. The only legal tender is the Croatian dinar. And so on.

Members of B-H Territorial Defense [TO] are there—manpower under command of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. In Busovaca and Novi Travnik, the men of the B-H TO rebelled because of the insupportably humiliating position, and an armed conflict ensued. The HVO is forcibly disarming the members of the TO. The battles in Novi Travnik were still continuing yesterday.

The Independent Pact

Izetbegovic and the top leadership of the B-H TO are silent about this. In spite of the reliable information that

there could soon be armed conflicts between the TO and the HVO in other places such as Mostar. The troops of the HVO are stationed even in the Sarajevo settlement of Stup. The public security station there has been abolished, and they have established the Sarajevo High Command of the HVO. There is every indication that the Croatian side intends to stretch "its part of B-H" even to a section of Sarajevo. Virtually from Neum, up the valley of the Neretva, Lasve, and then by way of Busovaca and Kiseljak, a part of Ilidza, the border reaches Sarajevo. From there, it bends toward Visoko, Kakanj, Zenica, Zepce, and up the Bosna River to Bosanski Brod.

In the "Croatian" areas of B-H, except for western Hercegovina, the Muslims are the majority! The Muslim people, for example, have a majority in Mostar, Bugojno, Travnik.... In Zenica, they represent all of 70 percent of the total population. Nevertheless, only members of the Croatian administration are "living" in all those places. Izetbegovic and the SDA [Democratic Action Party], who have taken over concern for the Muslim people, are maintaining a persistent silence on this.

In an interview with BORBA, Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic, a new member of the B-H Presidency, said that it is not true that the Presidency has verified or approved Izetbegovic's pact with Tudjman (which Izetbegovic's explanation unambiguously suggested). Dr. Kecmanovic sees this pact to be a very dangerous act. He feels that everything will be cleared up if a new political platform is speedily defined so as to remove all ambiguity concerning the internal arrangement of B-H and the position of this republic in the international environment. Dr. Kecmanovic admits that the possibility exists of deliberate obstruction of that platform, but if that occurs, he will make appropriate moves, including resignation.

Annexation or Occupation

Of the well-known public figures in B-H, only Dr. Zdravko Grebo has taken a position concerning the disputed alliance. On his own municipal radio program "99," he expressed rather harsh criticism of Izetbegovic and his alliances, warning of the possible grave consequences. The official B-H media are by and large not saying a word on this topic. In yesterday's OSLOBODJENJE, a lengthy column was published on the second page under the headline "Natural Ally: Croatia and the War in B-H"). It says that "the facts indicate that the Croatian Armed Forces on the territory of B-H are fighting for its liberation, that they are mainly made up of Croats in Herceg-Bosnia, and that military cooperation between Croatia and B-H, because they have a common aggressor, is not only necessary, but urgently so." Actually, this is precisely the same explanation which Izetbegovic gave. So, this column does not respond to the issues—Why the "chessboard" instead of the insignia of B-H, why is the HVO not under the command of the B-H TO, why is the Croatian dinar legal tender, why are the legal bodies of government being removed, and how is this being done, and why are there conflicts between the HVO and the TO...?

If the Croats in B-H and Croatia want to help in liberating B-H, why do they not do so within the framework of the only legal B-H TO, and do so under the insignia of the state of B-H? What would the reactions be if Izetbegovic concluded the same kind of alliance with Austria, say, and the Austrians introduced their own insignia, their own authority, their own currency on the areas which they liberated...? Would that be annexation or occupation?

The aggression of the Serbian side cannot be a justification or cover for amnesty of another aggression by the Croatian side, which, to be sure, is being concealed. A few people believe in Izetbegovic's assurances that everything will be put in its place after the war (at the same time, few are expressing public opposition or doubt). Those who are well-informed warn that Izetbegovic's alliances with Croatia have strengthened Karadzic in both the political and military areas. People in the world are coming more and more to realize that the Serbian and Croatian sides have a similar project (the differing execution is largely to the credit of Izetbegovic himself, who zealously resisted one project and closed his eyes to a second and furthered it). Precisely because of the news concerning the pact, recruitment into the Serbian Armed Forces in B-H is stepping up. Izetbegovic obviously does not realize that the Serbs of B-H cannot be recruited to fight in the ranks of the B-H TO if at the same time he is allowing the HVO to be an independent and legal army. And without the Serbs the battle for B-H cannot be won. Especially not when the ally Croatia is annexing on a large scale areas of B-H which are being taken by the troops of the HVO.

Serbian Assembly on Bozovic Vote of Confidence

92BA1192A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
26 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by S.P. Stamatovic and M. Torov: "The Serbian Assembly on the Vote of Confidence to the Government of Radoman Bozovic: The Government Remains To Govern"]

[Text] *In a public vote 102 representatives were against a change in the government, 24 "for," and six abstained; a debate full of intolerance, disqualifications, and even insults.*

Belgrade—In a public vote, with 102 representatives against a change in the government, 24 for resignation, and six abstentions, representatives in the parliament of Serbia gave their support to the cabinet of Radoman Bozovic. Otherwise, the discussion on the occasion of the request by 27 representatives that a vote of lack of confidence in the government be announced turned largely into an interparty debate, discussions on personal disqualifications, and insults. When the mutual attacks, in which the main tone was set by Milan Paroski, Mihajlo Markovic, and Vojislav Seselj, reached the point of becoming red-hot, despite three warnings by the presiding Aleksandar Bakocevic, a pause was taken. The

chiefs of the representative groups agreed, as the president reported, that such remarks could not be permitted at the rostrum in order that the honor and repute of the Assembly be preserved.

Explaining the request of the 27 representatives for a recall of the government, the main instigator, Milan Paroski, said that the level of the blockade had been raised and the threat to Serbia, Yugoslavia, or Serbian Bosnia and the Krajinas certainly indicates that the government has not responded in an adequate way to these events. The job has not been done, and the government, which has not succeeded in foreseeing the consequences, is absolutely incompetent. The departure of this government is the only way to a government of democratic, parliamentary unity, or national salvation. Paroski said that the government is without any diplomacy, with a disorganized army, with an economy that cannot hold out for even a month, and it is incapable of providing for the interests of Serbs in the Krajinas.

Recalling his statement of several days ago in which he explained what the causes and the consequences of an economic and political blockade of Serbia are, Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic pointed out that he did not want to excuse the government from the incompetent qualifications of Paroski, "because I simply think that it would be a waste of time." "It is necessary to carry out a fundamental staffing reconstruction of the Government of Serbia according to several criteria: the criterion of the effectiveness of individual ministers, since one of their number has succeeded in the best way in performing all duties under his responsibility. The second criterion would be that a distribution of responsibilities between the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Serbia be carried out so that there is no overlap in individual spheres," Bozovic stated.

He vigorously rejected the charges that the government had not responded in an appropriate manner to the blockade and to the blackmail of the international community and thus put the national interest in question. "This government is not prepared to accept the proclaiming of Serbia and Serbs as occupiers and aggressors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A second important stand from which the government will never deviate is that any part of Serbia under anyone's pressure be declared special and seceded zones. Everything else can be the subject of political dialogue, tolerance, an attempt at building parliamentary unity in this Assembly, and constituting the structure of the government.

Again going to the speaker's dais, Paroski invited the prime minister to "move from the president's to a representative's chair, where his salary will be almost the same," and then other oppositional representatives directed sharp criticism at Bozovic and his government. To the comment of the presiding Aleksandar Bakocevic that the signators of the request that the government be recalled are all from the opposition except the Democratic Party (and one from the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]), Slobodan Vuckovic (DS [Democratic Party])

remarked that they did not sign it, but that they did stand behind it and would sign it, if necessary.

Mihailo Markovic attempted to prove that the government is extremely incapable and incompetent, with facts that "there are ministers (he mentioned Sokolovic) who have brought the security of citizens in Serbia, especially in Belgrade, to a low level, the phenomenon of the open criminal, and he criticized Bozovic for the fact that there is no clearly defined program for escaping the blockade and coping with the sanctions, as well as for complete economic collapse, casualties, and other consequences of war, and for the 'destroyed reputation of the Serbian nation.' No longer is Belgrade the capital of Serbia, but The Hague, Washington, Brussels. We have a president of the Republic, but he is no longer a man of influence who can decide for himself; instead the EC and UN decide in his name," Markovic said.

Vlatko Vukovic voiced support for a government of national unity, while Ljubisa Vukovic (SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]) said that the request for replacement of the government obviously constituted a precursor for the worsening of political stability in Serbia and "this parliament; this cannot be allowed."

When America and Germany seek the replacement of the Serbian Government, this is sufficient reason for us to be against it, said Dr. Vojislav Seselj, and only when they "get rid of us, can we talk." Paroski then called Seselj a spokesman for the Serbian Government.

With the comment that chaos reigns in Kosovo, Dzeljadin Idrizi reported that he is removing his signature from the petition against the government because Seselj misused it. According to Zivak Kulic, it is frivolous to make a move on requests for the replacement of a government whose greatest faults are that it is not carrying out foreign orders that Serbia be divided up, that 3 million Serbs outside Serbia and concern about refugees be denied, that it is worrying more about domestic than foreign interests and the status of the economy.... "If someone is guilty of everything that has befallen us, then it isn't the government, or parliament, or the president of the Republic, but those who call for desertion, to whom Albania is becoming a tutor, or those who believe that only elections that they win are democratic and loyal," Kulic said.

Aleksandar Prlja warned that the Croatian offensive is being renewed. We will have, he said, armed danger in all parts of the former Yugoslavia where Serbian people live. Political life in the future of our country, according to him, cannot be imagined without a democratic trend on the right, which would be ready for an offer, and not just for destruction.

Radomir Urosevic supported a request for the resignation of the government, and he said that the president of the government has shown, from the onset, "unseen arrogance from earlier times. In a secret vote, no one would elect him."

In the afternoon the session continued with a discussion on the proposal of conclusions on the occasion of sanctions.

[Box, p 5]

I Have a High Opinion of Myself

"I have too high of an opinion of myself, regardless of whether I am prime minister or not, to polemicize with that degree of lack of political culture that Mr. Paroski has expressed here," said Radoman Bozovic, emphasizing that it indeed surprises him that his government is accused of failing to take national interests into account and that those who signed the request for the recall of the government have voiced this accusation. "I think that the list of signatories is the best answer as to whether such a charge can be directed at this government," said Bozovic.

[Box, p 5]

Mining According to Plan

The question of representative Milan Paroski: "Why was the airport in Bihac, which cost the equivalent of two nuclear carriers, mined, and then conveyed to Serbian Krajina, and who gave such an order? Because of this the Supreme Command and the Yugoslav Army have not mined the Pleso airport or the one in Split, and then surrendered to the Ustashi with their equipment. Why wasn't the Skopje airport mined, and then turned over to Macedonia?"

Serbian Defense Minister Marko Negovanovic answered: "The mining of the airport in Bihac was carried out in accordance with the plan of the authorized command."

The question by Momcilo Grubac: "Will students who are subject to a military obligation, to serving a military tour of duty, whose one-year obligation expires in September 1992, continue their military service for another three months, and in this case lose the opportunity to study regularly in the coming school year as well? Is it possible, with regard to the number of such individuals subject to a military obligation, for them to be exempted from the obligation of serving an extended military tour without damage to the interest of defense, or that they fulfill their obligation at a time when there is no faculty instruction, in order for the costs of studying to be reduced and studying for a full two school years to be avoided?"

The minister of defense answered: "Because the Order on Maintaining Those Subject to a Military Obligation on Reserve Status in the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia was issued by the Presidency of the SFRY, a possible decision on ending its validity, on the basis of the continuity of Yugoslavia and in accordance with the new Constitution, can be made by the Presidency of the FRY, on the basis of an evaluation by the Supreme Defense Council, or as proposed by the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia. We know that such a possibility has been

considered for some time, with an overall review of all important elements of the current situation."

[Box, p 5]

We Don't Miss When We Shoot at Flesh

In one of numerous retorts, Vojislav Seselj said the following: "It is not correct that we shot at taxi drivers. If we had shot, we would have hit someone. We shot into the air and thus we did not hit anyone. Let those know who otherwise deal with this, that in principle we never miss. When we aim at flesh, then we hit flesh. That is as far as someone is concerned there, what is his name?... Zimmerman's waiter (thinking of Mihajlo Markovic)...." said Seselj.

[Box, p 5]

Bozovic Declined To Replace Djukic

At the beginning of the afternoon part of the meeting, Vice President Borislav Petrovic informed the representatives that the president of the Government of Serbia, Dr. Radoman Bozovic, had rejected a request for the replacement of the minister of culture, Miodrag Djukic.

Yugoslav Army General on Coup Preparations

92BA1159C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 92 pp 55-58

[Interview with Maj. Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic, former head of the Counterintelligence Service, by Svetislav Spasojevic; place and date not given: "Whether a Coup d'Etat Was Prepared"]

[Text] *Kadijevic is not a traitor, and other people's guilt is being dumped on him; Bogic Bogicevic against a state of emergency; the army's sin: It did not remove the civilian authorities in time; Tadjman's fear of a coup d'etat; problems with (a lack of) confidence in the state leadership; Stane Dolanc, architect of Yugoslavia's collapse.*

NIN has an opportunity to offer its readers an accurate answer to a sensitive question: Was the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] preparing a military coup?

Childishly enamored of an illusory Yugoslavism, many people wanted the army, in the first days of the war and even later, to halt the collapse of the federal state! Upset, they cried out that the generals, who were withdrawing along with the soldiers from Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina, really needed the help of a psychiatrist. No fewer were the people who say longingly even today that the civilians, asleep, incompetent, and inclined toward treason, should have been removed from the throne of power by force.

Of course, another side also existed. According to the assessment of the former, it relied on its own weakness.

The third side is the army itself. Divided between the verbally adopted option that it was the "connective tissue of fraternity and unity," and rule by force, it could

not avoid disorientation, as it is thought today. Consequently, it also could not avoid a path on which it was exposed to insults, humiliation, indecent accusations....

[Spasojevic] During the abandonment of Slovenia, what was the mood in the army like?

[Vasiljevic] Junior officers, including also somewhat younger generals, were in favor of clearing up the situation through radical measures. They could not understand at all our exaggeratedly cautious behavior.

[Spasojevic] Was the mood determined by ethnic identity?

[Vasiljevic] No, not at all. Radical measures were advocated by the majority, and Slovenes were also among them. This, however, does not mean that there were not also those who said: "I cannot be against my own people." There were very few such people. One should know, however, that a radical settling of accounts with nationalism was advocated on the entire territory of the country, and not just, for example, in Slovenia.

[Spasojevic] Thus, at that time, also in Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija], Krajina, Slovenia...?

[Vasiljevic] Of course.

[Spasojevic] Why, then, was Gen. Kadijevic so indecisive? Many people have used that conduct of his as a reason to accuse him of treason.

[Vasiljevic] I was a military intelligence officer for years, and for a while also the head of the KOS [military counterintelligence service]. I am mentioning this in order to give my statement about Veljko Kadijevic its real significance. All the accusations about the general's alleged treason are incorrect and laughable.

[Spasojevic] Mr. Kadijevic spent some time being educated in the United States!

[Vasiljevic] That "argument" of yours supports my claim. The army sent only proven people to be educated abroad. In fact, the KOS also participated in selecting them. Believe me, I know very well that Gen. Veljko Kadijevic, the former federal secretary, was and remains a Yugoslav. It is a completely different matter that he lacked military decisiveness, and that in his intellectual and mental makeup he was more inclined toward diplomacy, and less toward military views. The people constantly waited and demanded exclusively from the army that it undertake something. I think that that is also the case today. Salvation is expected from it. It is interesting that this is not expected from the state Presidency!

[Spasojevic] Why, then, didn't you react differently in Slovenia, if the mood for that existed?

[Vasiljevic] The army has two general principles that it did not want to renounce. The first is that it will not stay in a republic if the people of that republic do not want it. The other is the principle that it is not a rebellious army. Those two principles should be continually kept in mind in talking about the army's behavior. First, we were declared an occupying army in Slovenia. The Slovene

people rose up against us. It was not mercenaries who were shooting at us there and killing smooth-chinned soldiers, but rather Slovenes. The situation in Macedonia was also the same. No one put up a barricade to stop us. We expected it. If that had happened, we would have dealt very quickly and easily with those who were driving us out. The army, in fact, was not in a position to take different steps, in spite of its awareness that they were essential and salutary. If someone wants to seek a culprit, I refer him to the state Presidency. It nevertheless also had the army leadership's proposals about what steps should be taken.

[Spasojevic] What are those other steps that you advocated?

[Vasiljevic] A state of emergency. That was in March 1991, a time when the paramilitary forces in Croatia were armed and when the army was being fired upon in Pakrac. Bogic Bogicevic's vote decided that a state of emergency would not be introduced!

[Spasojevic] Who is Bogic Bogicevic? Did the KOS know anything more specific about him?

[Vasiljevic] Not at all. We were not concerned with any member of the Presidency. Others are conducting their own counterintelligence protection. Those are civilians and....

[Spasojevic] Specifically, who is "concerned with" members of the Presidency?

[Vasiljevic] The Federal SUP [Secretariat of Internal Affairs]. They are their concern, and we cooperate with them. But let me tell you something: No one is directing the brunt of his criticism where there has objectively been a betrayal of general Yugoslav interests, i.e., the state leadership. The KOS has examined all the events and offered them for the consideration of the state leadership, with a proposal of the measures for how to stop all this. The army sought a state of emergency, i.e., the suspension of civilian authority and the introduction of martial law.

[Spasojevic] Did the military leadership request a state of emergency for Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia...?

[Vasiljevic] No, not at all! The introduction of the measures was only proposed on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, because reasons existed there. The Presidency rejected our proposal, and we did not even receive the public's support! I think, and I know that I share the opinion of a majority of the army personnel, that it does not justify us much that the state leadership did not take the right step. We should have done it.

[Spasojevic] What would you have done?

[Vasiljevic] The army made a mistake because it did not remove the civilian authorities and introduce a state of emergency on its own initiative, i.e., restore order in the country. The various "armies" should have been disarmed, the parties should have been abolished, and

conditions for democratic elections should have been prepared as soon as possible.

[Spasojevic] Did the military leadership indicate such a possibility to the Presidency?

[Vasiljevic] I honestly do not know that. I think, however, that many people sensed that danger. We had a meeting, the state and army leaderships, in the vicinity of Belgrade, at a military installation. Some of them allegedly joked, saying: "Have we been brought here to be arrested?" Those whose conscience was not clear had military security. They changed the place they were staying every night.

[Spasojevic] Gen. Vasiljevic, we have been talking for a long time, but I cannot summon up the courage to ask you: Did the army have a plan worked out to eliminate the leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia?

[Vasiljevic] It did, and it was worked out in detail.

[Spasojevic] Let us simplify the matter even further: Did that plan entail the arrest of Milan Kucan and Franjo Tudjman, along with the entire leadership of Slovenia and Croatia?

[Vasiljevic] Yes... but that does not mean the liquidation of any of them. They would all have been isolated for a certain period. The places where they were to be kept were located on the territory of Slovenia and Croatia.

There is nothing strange, and least of all illegal, about all this. The army was and has remained an organization that above all respected legality. Every real and serious counterintelligence service possesses at all times accurate assessments of circumstances, events, and the people around it. We could not let a state of emergency come about, and only then work out plans for military activities. Anyone who thinks so has a terrible idea of the Yugoslav Army, and especially of the service that I headed. If by some chance we had done anything different, we could have ended up making plans when the situation in the country would already have been settled, or the designers of the plans would be removed. Caution is a rule that assumes the characteristics of an instinct.

Accordingly, it is quite understandable and justifiable that plans existed for removing the leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia. I assume that now you are interested in whether such a plan also existed for Serbia?

[Spasojevic] Of course! And for Macedonia...

[Vasiljevic] They did not exist, and here is why. Such plans are not developed just in case, as some sort of preventive measure. That is why specific reasons are essential, which in any case existed in the two former western republics, also of the former Yugoslavia.

Several times, you recall, in Ljubljana and in Zagreb, it was publicly stated by the highest officials that the army had such plans. The uninformed may think that the secret of the existence of the plans developed had been exposed. Not at all! Only the innermost personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and the top commander at a

certain level knew about them. Along with us at headquarters, Gen. Konrad Kolsak, the commander of the Zagreb Military Region, also knew about them.

[Spasojevic] Gen. Kolsak is a Slovene?

[Vasiljevic] Yes.

[Spasojevic] The KOS had confidence in him?

[Vasiljevic] Unlimited. We were in agreement that as commander of the Zagreb Military Region, the jurisdiction of which also included Slovenia, he would be informed of the secret plans. I will cite an example for you, from which you will very easily conclude how many people knew the plans existed. Recently journalists asked Gen. Milan Aksentijevic whether the option of a military coup existed. The answer was negative, I assume not because the general wanted to hide anything, but rather because he did not know that the plans existed.

[Spasojevic] When exactly were the plans developed?

[Vasiljevic] In the summer of 1990, first for Slovenia, and then for Croatia as well.

[Spasojevic] General, all that is too ideal. We say that the government is the image of the people. Why would the army be different?

[Vasiljevic] In the business I was involved in, facts are essential, i.e., they are decisive, and not emotions. I did not tell you that everything was ideal, but it happened as I am saying. That does not mean that a compromise did not exist, or rather an attempt to betray a military secret. To my great regret, in the military security bodies in Slovenia we discovered an attempt to betray a secret to the Slovene leadership. Sergeant First Class Janez Napotnik obtained the key to a safe used by the chief of security at the Ljubljana corps command. He noticed that Gen. Simeon Tumanov, the deputy chief of the Security Administration, and I were frequently coming to Ljubljana. Let me tell, by the way, that at the beginning of May Gen. Tumanov was retired just because he was a Macedonian. To shorten the story, the KOS caught Sergeant First Class Napotnik in the act, and found out from him that he had been recruited by the head people of the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the beginning, he was in direct contact with Ivan Erzen, the chief of the Slovene State Security Service. At the time we discovered Sergeant Napotnik in Ljubljana, Erzen was an assistant of Gen. Petar Gracanin, federal secretary for Internal Affairs.

[Spasojevic] Did Erzen leave visible traces, and so you discovered him?

[Vasiljevic] He was exposed by Milan Kucan and several other Slovene leaders. They said everywhere that the army was preparing a military coup. This was the summer of 1990, and almost all the leading people in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were seized by a persecution mania. For example, Alija Izetbegovic claimed that he would be killed, and that is why he never spent two nights in the same bed! The Slovenes, however, were foremost in warning that a coup was being

prepared. That became suspicious to us, and consequently we rushed to Slovenia to check on whether information was being leaked somewhere. We reached Napotnik very quickly. In any case, the safe whose key he acquired did not contain any confidential documents on the plan developed for martial law. The documents were kept at the Supreme Command headquarters in Belgrade.

[Spasojevic] What happened with Sergeant First Class Napotnik?

[Vasiljevic] We kept him like our greatest treasure, and with his assistance, we regularly sent Mr. Kucan, Dolanc, Bavcar, Jansa, and the others "confidential" documents. We conducted a double game. With his help, we found out what the Slovene leadership wanted to know about the army.

This, in any case, was not an isolated example, i.e., not everything is ideal even in the army.

[Spasojevic] Plans were made, detailed preparations were carried out, precautionary measures were taken.... Were the forces that would carry out the plans designated?

[Vasiljevic] Special military police units. These are people trained for antiterrorist operations. They are the specialists who participated along with me in the arrest of the entire group involved in the "Spejelj case" and the liberation of Milan Martić. That is only part of the units. In such circumstances, the use of other combat means is also planned. They carry out certain military activities along other lines—for example, closing the border crossings and blocking all roads toward the border in order to prevent possible outside intervention. Air landing premises are occupied.

[Spasojevic] Did the service that you headed have accurate information about how the world would react to the removal of what were nevertheless democratically elected regimes in Zagreb and Ljubljana?

[Vasiljevic] A belief is prevalent among the public, the main characteristic of which is that everything is a wonder for two days, i.e., it was believed, and people still think so today, that certain foreign regimes would have gotten a little angry, but that everything would have settled down very quickly. Some people even said that the West would have viewed that possibility favorably. All of this was just pouring oil on the fire and water on the water mill that was supposed to grind out the thesis that the army had to and was obligated to carry out a military coup.

The KOS's information indicates a completely opposite conclusion. The sources from which our information originated were rated very highly. We also obtained the same information from sources responsible for carrying out that policy. According to the KOS's information, a coup d'état would have been interpreted in the West as a suppression of democracy in countries in which it had just been started. In their assessment, this would have been a rebellious act with far-reaching consequences for

the development of democracy, not just in Yugoslavia but also in Europe. The West answered Mr. Tudjman's warnings that the JNA would carry out a coup by promising that it would back the "young Croatian democracy." That is our information from several sources.

[Spasojevic] At the time when a great deal was being said vocally about the possibility of a coup d'état, there was also talk about disunity in the army. How much truth is there in these stories?

[Vasiljevic] As everywhere, there was also dissension within the army, but it was not critical. Specifically, it involved peripheral issues, to put it mildly. There was public manipulation regarding a serious division in the army's leadership. Consequently, the so-called hard line and radical line, the "hawks" and "doves," did not exist. Until the end of the war in Croatia and the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, there was unity within the leadership, to which I belonged, on the crucial decisions. So that we do not wander around this any more, at least 20 people in the military leadership itself knew about and participated in drafting the plans for removing the regimes in Slovenia and Croatia, and the entire matter was not compromised. I stand behind this assertion—Maj. Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic, the head of the KOS. That group included Muslims, Slovenes, and Croats, and the plan was not compromised. Doesn't that fact tell you enough about the unity of the military leadership? Why wouldn't you ask whether disunity was perhaps imposed upon us, moreover with great difficulty, by the civilians, i.e., the state authorities?

[Spasojevic] You are saying that about 20 people knew about the preparation of the plans. These were exclusively military personnel. I assume that certain high military officials were not informed about the big military secret. I am interested in whether you informed the state leadership about everything, and whom?

[Vasiljevic] That is a very sensitive question. At that time the state leadership also consisted of certain people to whom such a matter could not be entrusted. I am not certain whether the plan was discussed by the state Presidency, although I believe that Bora Jović was informed of everything that we were preparing.

[Spasojevic] What about the State Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order? That body is composed of people of the highest confidence.

[Vasiljevic] The council is not a body with the jurisdiction to discuss this. At its meetings, specific situations are discussed, and proposals are made to the state Presidency regarding what it should do to resolve them.

[Spasojevic] After all this, can I conclude that the military leadership, or a part of it, developed plans on its own initiative to remove the regimes in Ljubljana and Zagreb? I am asking you this for the second time.

[Vasiljevic] Although it is true that we did not request permission from the Presidency, or anyone else, that can nevertheless not be characterized as an independent

initiative. By virtue of its function, the Supreme Command's headquarters has to have its own plans worked out. Consequently, nothing was done in violation of the existing law, i.e., these were an integral part of the plans for use of the armed forces. Obviously, we did not have rebellious intentions.

[Spasojevic] It is strange, however, that all members of the Presidency did not know anything about such a sensitive matter!

[Vasiljevic] You must always keep in mind exactly who was in that Presidency. Several members of the Presidency were in direct contact with foreign services. How could such a matter, or any other, be entrusted to Janez Drnovsek, who played tennis on courts in Austria almost every weekend? Vienna has always had good contacts with Bonn. Not to mention the contacts of Vasil Tupurkovski, Stipe Mesic.... The country is burning up, and there is no one to give you a pail of water. If he does, there is a good chance that it is full of gasoline. It is now clear to you why it seems laughable to me when people talk about treason by Gen. Veljko Kadijevic and several other honorable officers. Those who ran to embassies to report everything and everyone have been shamelessly accusing the army.

Stane Dolanc was allegedly a trustworthy person. Just recall everything that happened. Carefully examining everything that was happening around him, we realized that he was one of the initiators of Slovene separatism. A KOS major became a leading Yugoslav politician and managed to spread the idea that third-rate politicians from the republics should become members of the Presidency. Very cunningly planned. That was the initial step toward the collapse of Yugoslavia. Above all, Stane Dolanc, and then also other leading people from Slovenia, knew that negative selection at the federal level would have a crucial and unfavorable effect upon the functioning of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav armed forces. According to some KOS information, the Slovene leadership worked persistently to overthrow Fleet Admiral Branko Mamula, the federal secretary for National Defense.

[Spasojevic] Whom did Admiral Mamula bother?

[Vasiljevic] He bothered Stane Dolanc, Milan Kucan, and the other Slovenes. They wanted the top man in the army to be a civilian, and if possible from Slovenia. Viewed from today's perspective, when we are living in a multiparty system and a more or less democratic society, the idea that the defense minister should be a civilian is completely acceptable. At that time it was political speculation.

[Spasojevic] Back when Stane Dolanc ruled the Yugoslav intelligence services—I am thinking of military and civilian ones—the Federal Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order attracted particular attention from citizens. We uttered its name in a whisper. It is a place where the most confidential information in the country comes. By virtue of your office, you were a member of that famous council?

[Vasiljevic] Yes, I was a member of the council at the time when Bogic Bogicevic chaired it. Now it is Jugoslav Kostic.

[Spasojevic] Who else attends the meetings of that council?

[Vasiljevic] Several members of the state Presidency.

[Spasojevic] Does anyone from the republic attend?

[Vasiljevic] No one. In addition to those I mentioned, the federal secretary for internal affairs and the chief of the SID also attend.

[Spasojevic] What is concealed behind that abbreviation?

[Vasiljevic] It is the Research and Documentation Service of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. In addition to them, the meetings are also attended by the federal secretary for national defense, the head of the military intelligence service, and the chief of the JNA's Security Administration. There is also Andjelko Maslic, the council's secretary, and his technical service. The council is an operational body at the highest state level. All the most essential data on the country's fate are summed up there. The members of the council, for example, propose that the Presidency undertake specific measures.

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DATE FILMED

27 July 1992